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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of the research is to evaluate the effectiveness of humanitarian INGOs 
in delivering relief and implementing the relief-to-development approach in 
complex political emergencies by using the case of Operation Lifeline Sudan 
from 1994 to 2004. Modern complex emergencies have wrought change to the 
manner in which INGOs approach CPEs and the nature of the functions they 
perform. Their involvement has grown in both duration and breadth of activity, 
and their ideology is moving away from traditional humanitarian principles. This is 
clear from INGOs accepting the relief-to-development approach. This approach 
is based on the notion that integrating development and rehabilitation activities 
into the relief mandate will ameliorate the root causes of violence and contribute 
to the peace-building process. However, the ability of INGOs to foster 
development and create self-sufficiency within the context of CPEs is disputed, 
as the local context may not be conducive to development and rehabilitation. 
Furthermore, the various weaknesses and problems associated with 
humanitarian INGOs calls into question their ability to implement this continuum.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Setting the Scene for the Study 
Since the 1970s, a profound shift has taken place in the roles of the public, 
private, and nonprofit sectors. In the wake of the fiscal crisis, the end of the Cold 
War, ideological attacks, and privatization, the scope and capacity of national 
governments have declined. The sector of nonprofit non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) has begun to fill the vacuum left by nation states 
particularly in the area of international relief and development activities (Bryant 
and Lindenberg, 2001: 1). Decaying state capacity encouraged the appearance 
of international welfare safety nets, implemented by international humanitarian 
non-governmental organizations (hereafter referred to as INGOs). The 
exponential growth of the humanitarian system and INGOs can be attributed to 
the proliferation of violent intra-state conflict; the growth of subcontracting 
(Duffield, 1997: 533); and the watering down of considerations about state 
sovereignty. 
 
The proliferation of violent intra-state conflicts has challenged those international 
agencies, assisting people affected by disasters, as the traditional principles of 
humanitarianism became increasingly difficult to maintain within a complex 
political emergencies (CPEs). Concerns pertaining to accountability, 
transparency, lack of local knowledge, problems with monitoring and evaluation, 
and, importantly, aid that fuels the war economy, have raised questions 
regarding the effectiveness of INGOs operating in CPEs.   
 
This has led to humanitarian INGOs adopting a “do no harm” approach, whereby 
relief should embrace rehabilitation and reconstruction by implementing longer-
term development programmes. The relief-to-development continuum was first 
adopted by Operation Lifeline Sudan in 1994, and it placed humanitarian INGOs, 
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operating under the UN umbrella organization, within the development 
framework.     
 
1.2. Research Problem 
The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of humanitarian INGOs in 
delivering relief and implementing the relief-to-development approach in complex 
political emergencies by using the case of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) from 
1994 to 2004. Have INGOs succeeded in implementing the relief-to-development 
continuum within the context of a CPE, and what consequences have this policy 
had on the peace-building process in Sudan? OLS was a UNICEF-lead 
consortium established in 1989 as a tripartite agreement of negotiated access 
among the Government of Sudan (GoS), the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the UN. Even though OLS was created in 1989, 
the focus of this paper will be from 1994 to 2004, because the relief-to-
development continuum was first integrated into the humanitarian mandate of 
OLS in 1994. It was a conglomerate of more or less forty-five international and 
indigenous NGOs formed to oversee the coordinated delivery of humanitarian aid 
in Sudan (Zowe, 2004). Each INGO, which was operational in Sudan, had 
responsibility for a particular area of the country and worked closely with local 
Sudanese authorities on either side of the conflict, adhering to strict codes of 
conduct or “ground rules”, based on neutrality (Robinson, 2002). The civil war 
ended on January 9, 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (Burns and Maxwell, 2008: 7; GoS and SPLM/A, 2005). OLS was 
superseded by the Integrated Sudanese Country Programme in January 2005 
(United Nations, 2008). 
 
While OLS will be studied holistically, because it is an umbrella organization, a 
sample of INGOs will be taken to illustrate how OLS coordination fits into the 
humanitarian space. Even though these agencies had the same mission, their 
mandates differed; and how these differences were integrated in the operation 
will shed light on the ability of OLS to coordinate the activities of INGOs in the 
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field. The focus will be on Oxfam, World Vision, CARE International, Save the 
Children Foundation (SCF), and Medicine sans Frontier (MSF), as these INGOs 
had been operational in Sudan since the 1980s. Furthermore, because these 
agencies were large and financially strong enough, it is assumed that their 
activities and actions should have had an effect on the ground. 
 
1.3.  Relevance of the Study 
OLS makes for an interesting case study for three reasons. First, from April 1989, 
through the end of 1993, INGOs involved in OLS focused mainly on saving lives 
by providing food, shelter, and medical and sanitary services to refugees and 
internally displaced peoples (IDPs). Attention, however, began to shift towards 
rehabilitation and reconstruction in 1994. The GoS and the SPLM/A demanded 
that OLS should adopt a relief-to-development policy (Efuk, 2000). This shift in 
the operational mandate placed OLS within a peace-building framework. Related 
to this, five to ten years after implementation, peace-building initiatives should 
theoretically create conductive conditions for peace (Paffenholz and Spurk, 
2006). Thus, by evaluating OLS from 1994 it is possible to determine whether the 
actions of INGOs have had a positive impact on the peace-building process in 
Sudan.  
 
Secondly, OLS can shed light on the debate regarding the linkage between aid 
and development, and the effectiveness of INGOs in implementing relief-to-
development policies in protracted CPEs. Within the international humanitarian 
system, there is disagreement about the potential contribution of the relief-to-
development continuum to peace-building processes. Supporters claim that the 
relief-to-development continuum decreases the risk of beneficiaries becoming 
dependant on aid, and that development programmes can be successfully 
implemented during ongoing conflicts. Furthermore, development will address 
the root cause of conflicts and contribute to the peace-building process. Thus, 
INGOs should integrate the relief-to-development approach into their relief 
mandates. Critics argue that the relief-to-development continuum cannot be 
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implemented within the context of a CPE. It is impossible for relief to link to 
anything that may foster development because the local infrastructure, the 
economic markets, the health sector and the agricultural sector have all been 
destroyed (Bradbury et al. 1997). Furthermore, INGOs are notorious for their lack 
of analyzing the local environment, suggesting that their development 
programmes will not meet the needs of their beneficiaries. Thus, INGOs should 
limit their programmes to the delivery of emergency humanitarian relief. From 
1994, INGOs operating under the mandate of OLS delivered both emergency 
and development relief. Consequently, it is possible to study the effects of both 
forms of relief within Sudan and shine light on the debate concerning which form 
of relief should be implemented within the context of a CPE. 
 
Thirdly, OLS was the first humanitarian program that sought to deliver aid to IDPs 
and war-affected civilians during an ongoing conflict within a sovereign state, as 
opposed to the refugees beyond its borders. This established a framework 
whereby the warring parties conceded the principle that civilians caught in the 
conflict had a right to humanitarian assistance and that the international 
community had a right to provide it. In 1995, the Agreement on Ground Rules 
was established to reinforce this framework (Bradbury, Leader and Mackintosh, 
2000).  Thus, INGOs continually interacted with the domestic actors involved in 
the conflict in Sudan, while fulfilling their humanitarian mandate (Zowe, 2004). 
This should have been advantageous to INGOs as they had access to their 
potential beneficiaries on both sides of the conflict, and this should have given 
them greater knowledge of the situation on the ground, as well as foster 
operational learning.   
 
1.4. Literature Review 
In general the literature falls into three main categories, namely; reviews of 
dilemmas and issues that agencies need to take into account when considering 
appropriate and constructive modes of intervening in conflict zones (Anderson, 
Doughty and Olson, 2003); second, case studies and analysis of particular 
 5
conflicts (Efuk, 2000; Paffenholz, 2003; Goodhand and Lewer, 1999); and third, 
in-house oriented materials relating to codes of practice, skills-development and 
training (Aall 2001; Barnes 2005; Pouligny; 2005).  
 
While humanitarianism has always had a presence in international politics, it has 
never had the salience it enjoys today (Chimni, 2000: 243). This development 
can be attributed to the watering down of considerations around state 
sovereignty. The seismic shifts in the global political economy since the 1980s 
have moulded a new generation of violence and misery. Developing states, 
especially in Africa, no longer have the support of their Cold War patrons. The 
withdrawal of this support highlighted the various political and institutional 
weaknesses present in many states, which contributed to non-state actors 
challenging the legitimacy of the many governments, resulting in the increase of 
contemporary intra-state conflicts. Since the 1990s, most violent conflicts have 
been portrayed as humanitarian crises, which justify foreign intervention in the 
domestic affairs of sovereign states (Macrae, 2001). Furthermore, CPE are 
characterized by the deterioration or complete collapse of state capabilities. 
Where a population is suffering serious harm and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to advert the emergency, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect (Maley, 2002).  
 
The expanded definition of human security allows foreign parties to interfere in 
the domestic affairs of a nation-state, while still adhering to international law. 
Traditionally, security was understood in terms of threats to state sovereignty and 
territory. However, the prevalence of human rights abuses within CPEs have led 
to the development and advancement of the concept of security to include 
human security, which refers to such concerns as access to basic foodstuffs, 
quality of the global environment, and the economic welfare of populations 
(Thomas and Tow, 2002: 177-178). The unconditional respect of states’ 
sovereignty that had been the foundation of international relations that preceded 
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even the Cold War became conditional upon states adhering to liberal values and 
norms of international behaviour (Chimni, 2000). 
 
The expansion of the humanitarian system has relied immensely on the capacity 
of INGOs to launch large-scale humanitarian operations. Within the very large 
group of INGOs, a relatively small number dominates humanitarian action.  
Some 20 European and North American NGOs receive approximately 75% of all 
public funds spent on emergencies. The increased presence of INGOs is a 
reflection of the relative growth in resources that they command and the growing 
relevance of their activities in CPEs. The appearance of large, transnational 
INGOs has effectively globalised humanitarian responses, as INGOs are able to 
raise funds in one country, disperse them through an INGO in another, for a third 
to implement in the field (Macrae, 2001). The expansion of resources has been 
fostered by the increased proportion of donor government funding for 
development assistance channeled through INGOs; and the increased amount of 
development assistance funds directed towards humanitarian relief operations. 
INGOs have become the main mechanisms through which Northern states 
respond to CPEs in the South (Abiew and Keating, 1999). This development 
would have not been possible without the growth of subcontracting in the 1980s. 
In its basic form, this involves donor governments contacting out their aid 
programmes to INGOs. This development has made INGOs dependent on donor 
governments for financial resources. Consequently, INGO activities will be 
influenced by the interests of donor governments or the prevailing public opinion 
of the time. This does not only influence the particular CPEs they get involved in, 
but also the nature of functions they perform (Ranganathan, 2006: 211).  
 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols of 1977 are the 
primary sources of international humanitarian law, and offers guidance for 
humanitarian assistance by agencies specifically committed to this purpose. 
Traditionally, the rights and privileges accorded to INGOs are dependent on their 
adherence to the humanitarian principles of the International Committee of the 
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Red Cross (ICRC), namely humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. 
However, these principles can appear inadequate as guidelines for coping with 
the challenges posed by contemporary intra-state conflicts where belligerents 
ignore basic humanitarian principles (Ranganathan, 2006; Rigby, 2001). The 
evolution of forms of conflict in which warring parties have little or no respect for 
humanitarian principles; the retreat of the international security system from 
many parts in the world; and the growth in size and number of humanitarian 
agencies have made the implementation of the traditional humanitarian principles 
very difficult. Furthermore, humanitarian agencies are questioning whether they 
should still respect the conditions imposed on them by these principles if warring 
parties refuse to acknowledge the limits of war. Neutrality is regarded as 
undesirable, because either it is considered amoral, or it is impossible to achieve 
in CPEs (Fox, 2001: 227). Thus, INGOs have adopted a human rights based 
approach to humanitarian action in CPEs. Impartiality implies that all conflict 
victims should have access to humanitarian relief. However, by subordinating 
humanitarian objectives to political and strategic ones, some victims may be 
seen as more deserving than others (Curtis, 2001: 13). Many humanitarian 
agencies view impartiality only as a desirable goal, not an absolute condition 
(Ranganathan, 2006: 210). The principle of independence disagrees with the 
growing coherence between political objectives and humanitarian aid. Many 
INGOs are dependent on the financial support of donor states, thus violating the 
independence principle (Curtis, 2001: 13). Of all the humanitarian principles, only 
the primary commitment to humanity, and to some extent impartiality, carry any 
degree of immutability (Ranganathan, 2006: 199). 
 
In response, INGOs are modifying the manner in which they approach CPEs and 
the nature of the functions they perform. Their involvement has grown in both 
duration and breadth of activity, and their ideology is moving away from 
traditional humanitarian principles (Ranganathan, 2006: 197). This is clear from 
INGOs incorporating peace-building, development, and advocacy activities in 
their relief agendas. Notions of neutrality and non-interference are challenged by 
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peace-building activities of agencies that publicise and condemn human rights 
abuses, and engage in capacity-building activities (Rigby, 2001: 958).  
 
Concerned about relief creating dependency; sometimes doing harm and failing 
to address the root cause of emergencies despite its high costs; support has 
grown for the concept of development relief. In the context of CPEs, it has been 
argued that as effective development aid can reduce vulnerability to the impact of 
natural disasters, so it might also be used to contribute to the process of conflict 
resolution. Thus, the concept of the relief-to-development continuum became 
entwined with broader discussions about the contribution of official development 
assistance to conflict management (Bradbury et al. 1997; Cliffe and White, 2000). 
Adopting the relief-to-development continuum is a fundamental shift from 
traditional humanitarian principles as the continuum questions the lasting 
consequences of humanitarian programmes (Fox, 2001: 28). The relief-to-
development continuum is based on the notion that integrating development and 
rehabilitation activities into the relief mandate will ameliorate the root causes of 
violence. In other words, this continuum should theoretically address the causes 
of structural and direct violence and, in so doing, contribute to the peace-building 
process. Furthermore, capacity-building and rehabilitation will prevent 
beneficiaries becoming dependent on foreign aid. Closely linked to the relief-to-
development continuum is the concept of human rights-based humanitarianism. 
Human rights have become part of relief programmes, as INGOs are more willing 
to ignore the principle of neutrality and report human rights abuses. The 
continuum and the human rights based approach complement each other as 
both methods attempt to address the root causes of CPEs.   
 
INGOs generally operate on one or more of the following mandates: they seek to 
provide emergency humanitarian relief; promote long-term economic and social 
development; encourage respect for human rights; and support peace by 
encouraging non-violent conflict resolution. These goals are increasingly being 
viewed as being interrelated and interdependent (Anderson, 1996; and Natsios, 
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1995). INGOs are increasingly multitasking by integrating development 
programmes, human rights advocacy and conflict resolution activities into their 
relief programmes. This development is a response to the multifarious nature of 
contemporary CPEs.  
 
The literature is critical of the effectiveness of INGOs operating in CPEs. The 
debate on the performance of INGOs has intensified in response to a number of 
developments in the humanitarian sector. The growth of the system itself, the 
prolonged nature of many contemporary conflicts, and the Rwanda genocide in 
1994, gradually undermined the relative optimism that INGOs were just doing 
good. The realization that many of these conflicts were perpetuated by economic 
interest of the warring factions led to the notion that humanitarian aid, may in fact 
fuel the conflict (Griekspoor and Sondorp, 2001: 209). Humanitarian aid can 
often strengthen the predatory forces that sustain conflict when relief is 
manipulated by warring parties for their own gain. Furthermore, there are 
concerns pertaining to the belief that relief can create dependency among 
beneficiary populations. Concerns about INGO accountability casts further doubt 
on their effectiveness (Anderson, 2004). INGOs are accountable to three 
different actors: donors (public or private); their board of trustees; and their 
beneficiaries. This fragmentation of accountability brings into question the 
motives and effectiveness of INGOs in delivering aid. Critique concerning 
transparency, institutional amnesia and lack of local knowledge, and monitoring 
and evaluation incapability are also frequently raised against humanitarian 
INGOs (Pugh, 1998; Schloms, 2003; Efuk, 2000). Unlike for-profit organisations, 
INGOs are not required to release their financial or assessment reports to the 
public. Consumer feedback from beneficiaries are discouraged as negative 
feedback may potentially weaken an INGO’s position towards donors. 
Furthermore, the positive results INGOs do report on are often exaggerated in 
order to improve their standing with donors (Rhodes, 2002: 25). INGOs lack of 
knowledge concerning the local context of a nation suffering from a CPE is 
hampered by a high staff turn over and their unwillingness to use financial 
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resources to gather and diffuse knowledge. This results in what is known as 
institutional amnesia, where the same mistakes are cyclically repeated, the same 
imported assumptions are used and relief aid is consistently misappropriated 
(Rhodes, 2002: 11). Observers have noted that INGOs do little to monitor and 
evaluate the consequences that their relief programmes have on the local 
context. Effective monitoring and evaluation capacities are crucial to the “do no 
harm” approach, because this approach is premised on INGOs’ ability to 
determine whether their programmes have had a negative effect on the peace-
building process. 
 
INGOs have responded to the political effects of their work in three ways: the 
“mandate blinders” approach, the “aid on our terms approach”, and the “do no 
harm” approach. INGOs taking the “mandate blinders” approach feel that the 
intended purpose of their work is sufficiently important to justify them in ignoring 
the secondary effects of their actions. Such INGOs are usually acting on strong 
moral imperatives, under pressing time constraints, and they act unilaterally with 
little input from beneficiaries. INGOs adhering to the “aid on our terms” approach 
monitor the negative consequences of their relief programmes. If the negative 
impact begins to outweigh the positive, they may withdraw, offering to return 
when conditions become more conductive for effective intervention. The “do no 
harm” approach is premised on the principle of “first, do no harm”. According to 
this approach, INGOs should take responsibility for the unintended 
consequences of their actions. They actively seek to understand the 
consequences of their activities and to improve on their relief programmes. In 
Sudan, INGOs adopted the “do no harm” approach in an effort to identify the 
potential negative effects of their aid policies and to increase the efficiency of 
their relief programmes. Furthermore, some observers argue that INGOs should 
give up their apolitical stance and their activities should be directed towards 
supporting and protecting local opposition to war (Anderson, 1996; Okumu, 
2003). 
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The international humanitarian system has experienced exponential growth since 
the 1980s. The watering down of considerations around state sovereignty has 
made it possible for INGOs to gain access to nation-states suffering from CPEs. 
However, the nature of modern CPEs has made it necessary for humanitarian 
agencies to shift from traditional humanitarianism to human rights-based 
developmental humanitarianism by adopting the relief-to-development 
continuum. Furthermore, INGOs’ access to financial and material resources have 
expanded due to donors’ tendency to subcontract their relief programmes to 
INGOs. Despite their growth, various concerns about INGOs delivering 
humanitarian relief have been raised. These include accountability, transparency, 
institutional amnesia and lack of local knowledge, and monitoring and evaluation 
incapability. This has encouraged INGOs to adopt a “do no harm” approach, 
which requires INGOs to evaluate the long-term impacts of their relief 
programmes. 
 
1.5. Conceptual Framework 
The term complex political emergency has been used to describe situations that 
share some basic characteristics. A CPE is a multidimensional crisis with 
profound human suffering; the roots of the conflict are in part political, and may 
be complicated by natural disasters; and one dimension of the emergency is that 
the state is contested or has collapsed (Goodhand and Lewer, 1999: 73). The 
proliferation of CPEs in the 1990s has contributed to the growth of the 
humanitarian sector and INGOs. 
 
OLS was characterized by an absence of multilateral peacekeeping forces. Thus, 
the focus of this paper will be non-military humanitarian assistance. Throughout 
the history of OLS, access to and protection of war-affected populations was not 
guaranteed by the presence of peacekeeping forces, because negotiated access 
was obtained through the ratification of OLS by the UN, the SPLM/A, the GoS 
and the INGOs involved in this initiative.  
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Using Pamela Aall’s definition of NGOs, these organizations are: “private, self-
governing, non-profit institutions dedicated to alleviating human suffering, 
promoting education, economic development, health, environmental protection, 
human rights, and conflict resolution, and encouraging the establishment of 
democratic institutions and civil society” (Aall, 2000: 124). Within the international 
NGO community, humanitarian organizations are by far the most extensive group 
and comprise some of the largest agencies. Some of these organizations 
specialize in responding to humanitarian crisis and some divide their attention 
and resources between relief and development efforts (Aall, 2000: 125).  
 
Peace-building is understood as an overarching term to describe a long-term 
process covering all activities with the overall objective of preventing violent 
outbreaks of conflict, or to sustainably transform armed conflict into constructive 
peaceful ways of managing conflict (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 15). In the 
peace-building discourse, Galtung, distinguishes two forms of peace, namely 
negative peace (end of violence) and positive peace (peaceful society at all 
levels) (Galtung, 1969). Within the peace-building concept, self-sufficiency and 
sustainable development are seen as possible contributions to the peace 
process. In the context of OLS, the relief-to-development continuum was 
implemented as a means to create a positive, lasting peace in Sudan. Thus, the 
peace-building process refers to the implementation of the relief-to-development 
continuum. Furthermore, within the context of OLS, peace-building processes 
were implemented during an ongoing CPE. 
  
1.6. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical underpinnings of this research draw from a multidisciplinary base, 
including humanitarianism, development, and peace-building. Traditionally these 
have been treated as separate areas of study, each with their own practice and 
discourse. However, in recent years there has been a convergence of these 
paradigms, which has become manifest in the form of a relief-to-development 
continuum. The increasing realization of the need to respond to CPEs in a more 
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coherent and coordinated manner with a view to longer-term sustainability and 
capacity building, created ideas that humanitarian aid can be both developmental 
and also build long-term capacities for peace (Goodhand and Lewer, 1999: 69).  
 
Within this framework, sustainable development is seen as a possible 
contribution to peace processes (Pugh, 1998: 7). The long-lasting nature of 
contemporary CPEs has led to a desire on the part of the international 
community to move beyond relief and engage in rehabilitation and development 
even during ongoing conflicts (Harvey, 1998; Rigby, 2001). Thus, 
humanitarianism obtains a developmental characteristic, which should 
theoretically contribute to the peace-building process. Peace-building attempts to 
address the root causes of violence by ameliorating the structural violence 
present in CPEs. Peace-building is placed within the relief-to-development 
continuum. Thus, peace-building activities refer to rehabilitation, reconstruction, 
and local capacity building. 
 
In addition, it is believed that INGOs have a comparative advantage in 
strengthening a society’s capacity for peace. Through their work, humanitarian 
INGOs gather local knowledge, develop links with local actors, get direct access 
to war affected populations, and are often respected by all parties as an impartial 
and neutral actor (Scholms, 2003; Woodhouse, 2000). INGOs are able to 
implement the relief-to-development approach within states as the international 
community’s responsibility to protect takes precedence over the sovereignty of 
states. At the global level, the service delivery function of the state has been 
privatized as Northern governments prefer to respond to CPEs through 
subcontracting to INGOs. At the national level, the service delivery capacities of 
states experiencing CPEs are weakened or non-existent. Thus, the watering 
down of considerations about state sovereignty at the global and national level 
has enabled INGOs to intervene in CPEs.  
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The relief-to-development continuum has resulted in a division among 
humanitarian experts regarding the role of humanitarianism. Many INGOs, such 
as Oxfam, argue that the new relief agenda should be integrated with conflict 
resolution, respect for human rights, robust military intervention and with 
contributions to longer-term development. On the other hand, others believe that 
humanitarian activities should be restricted to immediate relief for survival, and 
they draw a line between emergencies that require intervention and sustainable 
development programs (Pugh, 1998: 7). 
 
The linkage between humanitarian relief and peace-building can be achieved in 
two, mutually complementary ways. Peace-building can be seen as the final 
phase of a ‘hand-over-process’ that begins with relief aid, leads to rehabilitation 
and development efforts, and ends with the construction of sustainable peace. In 
addition, peace-building can be viewed as an integrated approach that requires 
any actor, including INGOs, to integrate peace-building efforts into every state of 
engagement (Schloms, 2003: 42). 
 
After 1994, the operational mandate of OLS shifted from emergency relief 
towards rehabilitation and reconstruction at the request of the GoS and the 
SPLM/A. By evaluating the activities of INGOs within the relief-to-development 
framework, it is possible to determine whether these agencies have indeed 
contributed positively to the peace-building process by adopting a development 
approach to delivering humanitarian relief. 
 
1.7. Research Methodology 
A qualitative research methodology is adopted for this study as it is preoccupied 
with the impact of INGOs on peace-building processes in Sudan. This approach 
is more adept to the research as the emphasis in qualitative methodology strives 
for “a rich detailed description of specifics” in attempt to understand actions 
within a specific context (Babbie and Mouton, 2006: 272). By placing INGO within 
the context of OLS, qualitative methodology will be used to describe, understand, 
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and analyze the process. These descriptions will determine whether these 
agencies were proficient in contributing to the peace-building process, while 
acting within the relief-to-development continuum. 
 
The research was based on documentary analysis. Primary sources were 
obtained from international treaties and policy documents. These include UN 
policy documents and contractual agreements involving the UN, INGOs, GoS 
and SPLM. Secondary sources were obtained from documentary evidence 
ranging from books, journals both in print and online, and relevant websites. 
Secondary sources concerning theoretical frameworks applicable to 
humanitarianism, emergency and developmental relief and peace-building, as 
well as information concerning the evolution of the international humanitarian 
system were obtained from academic journals accessed through Wits’ online 
journal archive. Sources pertaining to Sudan’s civil wars and the history and 
evolution of OLS were obtained from books, available at Wits libraries, and 
journal articles. Information concerning INGO relief programmes in Sudan was 
obtained from online sources. These sources include the Humanitarian Policy 
Group, the Overseas Development Institute, the Global Politics Network, the 
Sudan Open Archive, the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict 
Management and the Integrated Regional Information Networks (Relief Web) 
websites. 
 
1.8. Outline of Chapters 
The study is organised in the following chapter summary. 
 
The purpose of chapter 1 is to place the study within a certain context. The 
discussion in the thesis will unfold as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 lays down the theoretical foundation of the following the chapters, by 
engaging in theoretical debates surrounding prevalent issues, namely the 
changing nature of state sovereignty; the growing need for humanitarianism and 
 16
the evolution thereof; and how INGOs, operate within the context of current world 
politics.   
 
Chapter 3 involves a detailed study of OLS. Evaluating how this operation was 
designed, identifying the underlying motives for choosing the OLS approach, and 
the evolution of OLS is the subject of this chapter.  
 
The activities of INGOs operating under the umbrella organization of OLS are 
studied in chapter 4. The sample, which includes Oxfam, World Vision, CARE 
International, Save the Children and Medicine Sans Frontier, are evaluated to 
determine how these different INGOs fit into OLS and the relief-to-development 
continuum; and their effectiveness and accountability are assessed. 
 
Chapter 5 reviews the central arguments of the thesis, while focusing on the 
analysis of humanitarian INGOs operation in OLS. What lessons can be learned 
from their experience with this UN umbrella organization? The findings of the 
study are reflected in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The post-Cold War era will be remembered as the epoch when intra-state 
conflicts were transformed, in the popular Western consciousness, and to no less 
extent in the language of international relations, into humanitarian emergencies. 
This reflects a collective discourse, which is intended to engender an extension 
of the international paradigm of security beyond the traditional Wesphalian 
premise (Greenaway, 2000).  
 
Within this context, the humanitarian system has enjoyed exponential growth and 
development. The evolution of the humanitarian system can be contributed to the 
watering down of considerations of state sovereignty; the prevalence of intra-
state conflicts being labelled as CPEs and humanitarian crises; the development 
and expansion of the concept of human security; and the withdrawal of 
diplomacy from states in the periphery by states in the core of international 
relations. 
 
Within the humanitarian system, the group of humanitarian actors that has grown 
most substantially is INGOs. INGOs have surfaced to play an increasingly 
important role alongside multilateral humanitarian operations. This development 
in the humanitarian sector reflects a greater tendency of globalisation: the 
changing role of governments and the increasing importance of subcontracting 
public functions to private actors. From this view, the involvement of INGOs in 
offering relief would not have been possible without the growth of subcontracting. 
Negotiated access has become the main means of expanding welfare safety nets 
in CPEs. Furthermore, INGOs tend to respond more rapidly and creatively to 
CPEs than international organisations, and this has helped the sector to gain 
legitimacy among donors and the public. 
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However, the humanitarian system as a whole, and INGOs specifically, have 
come under fire as the complex and protracted nature of contemporary intra-
state wars have brought to light the potential negative effects that aid may have 
on the local context. Within the milieu of CPEs, the traditional humanitarian 
principles, which guided the actions and mandates of humanitarian actors, have 
become increasingly difficult, even impossible, to implement within this changing 
environment. Traditional humanitarian principles are no longer applicable in the 
convoluted nature of CPEs. The humanitarian system has responded to this 
development by adopting the relief-to-development continuum and rejecting the 
traditional humanitarian principles of the ICRC. This new approach to 
humanitarianism has been named neo-humanitarianism. 
 
INGOs realised that their efforts to ameliorate the effects of conflict are limited 
and may even fuel conflict in various ways. Furthermore, INGOs have been 
criticised for lacking accountability, transparency and local knowledge, and 
having problems with monitoring and evaluation. INGOs have responded to 
these criticisms by rejecting the traditional humanitarian principles, and adopting 
a relief-to-development approach. 
 
2.2. The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty 
The traditional, Westphalian concept of the nation-state has come under fire as 
the scope and capacity of states to address the challenges arising from 
globalisation has diminished. The watering down of considerations of state 
sovereignty is because of the close and dialectical relationship of internal and 
external influences on statehood (Bryant and Lindenberg, 2001; Hobe, 1998).  
 
Firstly, developing states, especially African states, no longer enjoy political or 
economic support from their former Cold War patrons. The withdrawal of this 
support after the Cold War brought to light the various political and institutional 
weaknesses present in many states, which contributed to non-governmental 
 19
actors challenging the legitimacy of many governments, ensuing in the 
proliferation of contemporary intra-state conflicts. Secondly, the prolonged nature 
of these conflicts and the prevalence of CPEs undermined already weak state 
structures. CPEs are characterised by the state losing its monopoly over the use 
of force; the inability of the state to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens; 
and the blurring of the boundaries between combatants and non-combatants. 
Thirdly, the expanded definition of human security and the acceptance by the 
international community of the responsibility to protect allows foreign parties to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of a nation state, while still adhering to 
international law. Finally, donor states manipulate the humanitarian system by 
using humanitarian operations and agencies as an extension of their respective 
foreign policies. 
 
2.2.1. The Changing Nature of Warfare and Complex Political Emergencies 
The changing nature of warfare in the post-Cold War era has had a significant 
impact on the immutability of the concept of state sovereignty and the principle of 
non-interference. Furthermore, this development has stimulated the humanitarian 
sector, resulting in an exponential growth of humanitarian agencies (Wilkinson, 
2002: 64). As a result, it is no longer possible to separate humanitarian issues 
form the wider problems of peace and security. The increased incidence of 
conflicts generally, and the prevalence of wars within states, as opposed to 
between states, are often citied as distinguishing features of the “emerging global 
(dis)order” (Siebert, 2003: 61-62).  
 
Unlike traditional wars, intra-state conflicts do not presuppose the existence of 
states (Kaldor, 2006). The end of the Cold War and the subtraction of regional 
superpower interests and the associated ideological pressures permitted new 
local and regional conflicts to emerge, often characterised by the fragmentation 
of sovereign states. These kinds of intra-state conflicts have been referred to as 
complex emergencies or complex political emergencies (CPEs) (Wilkinson, 2002: 
64). CPEs are more likely to occur in states with a high dependence on primary 
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commodity exports such as oil in Sudan (Kent, Lautze, Leaning, Mazurana and 
Roberts, 2003: 2135). 
 
A CPE is a humanitarian disaster that occurs in a conflict zone and is 
complicated by, or results from the conflicting interests of the state (Goodhand 
and Lewer, 1999; Wilkinson, 2002). CPEs involve an intricate web of political, 
economic, military, and social forces engaged in violence. The term, emerging 
political complexes, describe new forms of state or non-state networks that 
create alternatives systems of profit, power, and protection; These networks use 
globalised trading structures to obtain necessary inputs via shadow and parallel 
economies; and they provide defence and administrative functions with little 
bureaucracy (Kent et al. 2003: 2135). 
 
The roots of the conflict are in part political and may be complicated by natural 
disasters. However, in many cases a marginally subsistent population is 
precipitated towards disaster by the consequences of militia action. One 
dimension of the emergency is that the state is contested or has even collapsed 
(Goodhand and Lewer, 1999; Wilkinson, 2002). CPEs include the fracturing of 
the state system, large refugee flows, protagonists motivated by psychological 
and economic factors, rather than ideological, or even racial, ethnic and religious 
causes. Violence becomes a rational means whereby belligerents seek to 
achieve their objectives (Pugh, 1998: 2). CPEs occur in the context of the global 
decline of sovereignty, and the disintegration of state where its monopoly of the 
legitimate use of violence is increasingly contested (Richmond, 2004: 135).   
 
Violence in CPEs is targeted overwhelmingly at civilians, their livelihood systems 
and social networks. Although much of the violence seems arbitrary and illogical, 
violence can be both functional (i.e. violence is useful for those controlling it) and 
specific (i.e. violence can support economic, political and social causes). Attacks 
on civilians often lead to widespread impoverishment, vulnerability and 
powerlessness. Human rights abuses and the destruction of economic and public 
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institutions combine to create an almost permanent state of insecurity in which 
the wealth and power of some people are generated at the cost of many people. 
CPEs are characterised by the absence of distinctions between war, peace, and 
crime. Furthermore, the division between belligerents and civilians has been 
watered down (Kent et al. 2003: 2135).  
 
The nature of CPEs has contributed to the growth of the humanitarian sector. 
CPEs present significant challenges to aid workers who should now more fully 
understand the political, military and economic dimensions of modern crises. The 
signing of OLS in March 1989 marked the beginning of the transformation of the 
international emergency response system’s approach to work in violent settings, 
from basic relief to humanitarian assistance. Political support for the concept of 
humanitarian governance (the use of humanitarian and human rights instruments 
to govern the behaviour of state and non-state actors in conflict zones) expanded 
as observers and aid workers realised that traditional humanitarian assistance 
was inadequate in the addressing the causes and symptoms of modern CPEs 
(Kent et al. 2003: 2135-3136). 
 
2.2.2. Human Security 
The widespread human rights abuses within CPEs have led to the development 
and expansion of the concept of security. According to Thomas and Tow, “[w]hat 
is needed today…is not so much territorial security – the security of the state – 
but human security, the security of the people in their everyday lives” (Thomas 
and Tow, 2002: 177). Traditionally, security was understood in terms of threats to 
state sovereignty and territory. During the 1990s, alternative explanations of 
security politics were introduced, encompassing such concerns as access to 
basic foodstuffs, quality of the global environment, and the economic welfare of 
populations inhabiting developing countries. The term human security has been 
developed as an idea that can be contrasted with national security. Furthermore, 
it can direct attention to an emerging and wider spectrum of security issues 
(Thomas and Tow, 2002: 177-178).  
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The concept of human security recognises that transnational threats to 
international norms arising from inadequacies in internal state systems make 
individuals and groups within states more vulnerable. It imposes constraints on 
state sovereignty because it is the responsibility of international actors to enforce 
states to comply with humanitarian norms. The humanitarian-based international 
norms underwriting the human security approach also fostered the belief that the 
international community was responsible for safeguarding individual rights where 
individual states failed to do so (Thomas and Tow, 2002: 178-180).  
 
This concept of human security can be linked to the globalisation of a particular 
model of governance, the liberal market democracy, and international norms 
regarding human rights. Globalisation has facilitated the transfer of liberal 
democracy, human rights and human security, and development as solutions to 
conflict. According to Richmond: 
 
 “[t]he contemporary peace-building consensus represents a nascent 
discourse and practice of both means and ends. This includes 
methods for the amelioration of conflict through mediation, 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance. Conflict resolution, 
prevention, and transformation approaches, and development 
strategies, incorporation of multiple actors in a multidimensional 
process…The outcome of this process is projected as a construction 
of liberal democracy, with a free market and globalised economy, 
progressive development strategies, and guaranteed human rights” 
(Richmond, 2004: 131-132) 
 
Thus, where a population is suffering serious harm and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to avert the emergency, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect. Furthermore, once the 
international community fulfils its responsibility through the establishment of 
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humanitarian and peace-building missions in CPEs, international norms 
determine what type of peace (or state) will be built, namely a liberal market 
democracy with development strategies and respect of human rights (Chimni, 
2000).  
 
It should be noted that implementing liberal market democracy in states suffering 
from civil war or CPEs has been severely criticised. Some argue that the 
establishment of liberal market democracies in the developing world has led to 
the various CPEs in the first place. Furthermore, this “one-size-fits-all” approach 
to resolving conflicts disregards the country specific political context of CPEs, 
indicating that this approach will not be able to identify or resolve the root causes 
that gave rise to the crisis. This suggests that only a negative peace will be built, 
while a positive peace remains out of reach.  
 
2.2.3. Withdrawal of Diplomacy  
After the end of the Cold War, Western governments became progressively more 
wary of using traditional military and diplomatic modes of intervening in conflict-
affected areas that are perceived as non-threatening to their strategic interests 
(Rigby, 2001: 957). By the time of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, humanitarian 
assistance had become the primary, and sometimes only, involvement from 
developed states in CPEs, particularly in parts of Africa (Kent et al. 2003). 
Humanitarian assistance became the West’s favoured response to political crisis 
beyond its borders, opening the space for humanitarian agencies to fill this void 
(Curtis, 2001; Macrea, 2001). Western governments became unwilling or unable 
to take comprehensive responsibility for alleviating the impoverishment and 
instability in crisis regions (Duffield, 1997: 532). Donors, not beneficiary states, 
are the main customers buying humanitarian services and have driven the 
enormous expansion in this sector (Greenaway, 2000). 
 
By the 1980s an evident change in government funding policy had occurred, from 
direct donor assistance to recognised governments in favour of international 
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support for private, non-governmental sectors (Duffield, 1997: 532). In a parallel 
development, the humanitarian capacities of the UN were strengthened. This 
international organisation was now seen as having a central and unique role to 
play in providing leadership and coordinating the efforts of international 
humanitarian agencies in delivering humanitarian assistance to disaster-affected 
populations (Kent, 2004: 865). This has enabled Western states to distance 
themselves from CPEs: humanitarian aid serves only to appease the Western 
conscience, and has been used by developed states as a substitute for political 
engagement to deal with serious issues of poverty, corruption and conflict in the 
periphery (Siebert, 2003: 67). Humanitarian assistance has become a convenient 
way to shore up the global image of donor states while at the same time 
providing a convenient diversion from global responsibilities (Mills, 2005: 167) 
Thus, humanitarian aid has filled the space left by the withdrawal of diplomacy 
(Curtis, 2001: 5).  
 
Observers have noted that donor states use humanitarian assistance as an 
extension of their foreign policy. Within the humanitarian system, donor states 
have become dependent on non-state actors to implement their foreign policies. 
UN agencies and INGOs are funded overtly in an explicitly political way. Money 
is given to support operations in places deemed important to the donors. For 
example, the humanitarian operation in Bosnia, where European states were 
afraid of a mass influx of refugees in their respective states, received more 
resources than the Rwandan operation (Mills, 2005: 167).  
 
The interests of donors do not only influence where humanitarian resources is 
allocated, but also the scale and type of humanitarian operation that will be 
operational. Influential donor states are able to influence the domestic politics of 
states suffering from humanitarian crisis. The selective allocation of humanitarian 
resources and varying levels of international effort and interest in responding to 
crises reflect the increasing politicalisation and legalisation of humanitarian 
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assistance, which threatens to transform humanitarian assistance into 
interference (Siebert, 2003: 61).  
 
The watering down of considerations of state sovereignty has stimulated the 
growth of the humanitarian system. Furthermore, it has empowered and enabled 
INGOs to gain access to states suffering from CPEs. The adverse effect 
globalisation has had on the immutability of the concept of state sovereignty has 
allowed humanitarian agencies to move beyond simple relief activities to more 
complex operations, which involve activities geared towards advancing human 
rights, development, rehabilitation, and peace-building. 
 
2.3.   Humanitarian Assistance in Protracted Crises 
The 20th century may well be described as the age of humanitarianism. In less 
than a hundred years, a booming business of humanitarian aid providers 
developed, comprising a broad variety of actors: governmental, inter-
governmental, and non-governmental (Heyse, 2003: 178).  
 
While the core humanitarian values of compassion and benevolence underlying 
activities to alleviate humanitarian suffering remain as valid today as ever, the 
image of the humanitarian system, which embodies these values on a global 
level, has been damaged. In the face of the international community’s glaring 
failure to respond effectively in CPEs, or to learn lessons, which might avert 
future ones, the role and effectiveness of the humanitarian system has been 
seriously called into question. Even where initial short-term relief responses have 
been effective in saving lives, the longer-term assistance required to prevent 
populations from sliding back into crisis conditions have often not been 
forthcoming (Hendrickson, 1998: 283-284). In essence, the problem can be 
understood in terms of the growing incompatibility between the humanitarian 
responses being proffered by the international community and the kind of crises 
being addressed (Hendrickson, 1998: 283-284). 
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The past fifty years of humanitarian aid provision have been characterised by two 
dominant trends. First, the complexity of the aid provision context increased 
continuously, thereby creating serious obstacles to effective aid provision. 
Second, the humanitarian aid community has expanded considerably as a result 
of the remarkable rise of NGOs in aid provision. This has created a more 
commercialised, diverse, and difficult to coordinate humanitarian aid sector, 
which resulted in an extra impediment to effective aid provision (Heyse, 2003: 
178). 
 
Numerous potential negative effects of humanitarian assistance in the context of 
CPEs have been identified. By setting up parallel NGO services, aid can hasten 
the collapse of already weakened state structures and may, by providing 
essential services that the state no longer delivers, allow governments to shift 
resources to military budgets, thus aggravating and prolonging the conflict. Aid 
can enable belligerents to avoid realising the true cost of the conflict, further 
undermining their will to return to peaceful coexistence. Humanitarian assistance 
can become a means for warring parties to sustain themselves, thus prolonging 
the suffering, and may escalate violence by attacking and raiding civilians. 
Striking agreements with warlords to permit aid to be delivered may bestow 
unrepresentative legitimacy on them. Aid can undermine local productive 
capabilities, thereby delaying the return to economic self-sufficiency and 
undermine local initiatives. If the distribution of assistance is observed to favour 
one community over another, animosity between neighbouring peoples and 
increased inter-factional conflict may result, thus aggravating the already tense 
situation. Paying economic inducements to protect aid workers may legitimise 
militias providing such protection. By providing humanitarian aid in crisis zones, 
there is a risk that parties to conflict may be deflected from assuming 
responsibility for the welfare of their own citizens (Lange and Quinn, 2003: 10) 
 
Since the first modern humanitarian principles were advanced, the context of 
humanitarian action has changed dramatically. When Henri Dunant witnessed 
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the slaughter and the suffering on the battlefield of Solferino in 1859, war was 
generally fought between two state armies along fixed lines of battle. War was 
perceived, whether rightly or wrongly, as being within the conduct of civilised, 
gentlemanly behaviour. Thus, humanitarian action was seen as an act of 
compassion rather than an act of politics. However, most wars today are not 
between states, but between a variety of state and non-state actors. It frequently 
takes place in poor, non-strategic countries. War is not necessarily about power 
and territory but rather about gaining access to resources. Most casualties are 
civilians and many combatants reject the logic of the Geneva Conventions. In 
response to the new complex environments, humanitarian assistance has 
evolved into neo-humanitarianism (Mills, 2005: 164). Neo-humanitarianism is 
principled, human rights based, politically sensitive and geared to strengthening 
those forces that bring peace and stability to the developing world. Neo-
humanitarianism is a product of the late 20th century crisis of underdevelopment 
in poor countries, and it offers new solutions to overcome past failures. Above all, 
neo-humanitarianism is political. It sees apolitical, neutral humanitarian relief as 
both naïve and morally questionable (Fox, 2001: 275). 
 
2.3.1. Traditional Humanitarianism 
At the outset, humanitarian assistance was envisaged as the provision of 
immediate, short-term relief for the wounded during armed conflict. 
Humanitarianism, when not bound to any specific context, is a rather general 
concept that can be explained as “concern for humanitarian welfare especially as 
manifested through philanthropy” (Ranganathan, 2006: 195). International law 
practices however have conferred a secondary meaning upon the term 
humanitarian, as a label to be applied in certain specific situations. Thus by 
convention, international humanitarian law (IHL) is the law prescribing the 
conduct of state-parties during armed conflict. Humanitarian assistance 
describes the actions taken to provide relief and limited protection to persons 
affected by the conduct of hostilities (Ranganathan, 2006: 196).  
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The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 are the 
primary sources of international humanitarian law, and provide guidance for 
humanitarian assistance by agencies specifically committed to this purpose and 
displaying certain characteristics. The traditional understanding of 
humanitarianism is further entrenched in the conduct of the ICRC and the 
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross that summarise the organisation’s 
operational ideology that consists of commitment to humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality and independence. (Ranganathan, 2006: 197). Following these 
principles allow humanitarian agencies the guarantees of access, safety from 
attack, and assistance from parties in conflict.  
 
The idea of humanitarian principles is simply that war has limits. The Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols set out, in considerable detail the limits 
of war (Leader, 2000: 6). These principles do not legally bind other agencies, but 
have served as prudential rules to guide their conduct. It has thus been popularly 
held that the rights and privileges accorded to humanitarian agencies are 
conditioned upon their adherence to these principles in carrying out prescribed 
tasks. These principles have described the humanitarian ideology as much as 
relief and protection have defined the humanitarian mandate. What is 
immediately striking about this conception is its ideological simplification of the 
role agencies must play. They must, in short, deliver material assistance, and 
pay no heed to the broader political environment (Ranganathan, 2006: 197).   
 
Short-term material assistance includes caring for the sick and wounded; supply 
of foodstuffs; medical supplies and clothing; distribution of materials for 
educational, recreational or religious purposes; assistance to captive persons; 
and measures to protect civilians and assist them to recover from the immediate 
effects of hostilities or disasters, and also to provide conditions necessary for its 
survival. While consent of the parties to the conflict is a prerequisite for 
undertaking protection and relief work, agencies adhering to the core principles 
of humanitarianism have a right to offer assistance to the parties. There is 
 29
general rebuke to the effect that parties must not regard acts of impartial 
humanitarian agencies as either interfering with their sovereignty or as unfriendly 
acts. Thus, they must not put forth impediments because of political motives or 
reasons related to the conflict (Ranganathan, 2006: 201).  
 
The principle of humanity, considered to be the primary principle, essentially 
contains three elements: to prevent and alleviate suffering; to protect life and 
health; and to ensure respect for the individual. These three elements must not 
only be the primary objectives of relief agencies, but traditional humanitarianism 
requires that these must also be the only objectives (Ranganathan, 2006: 195). 
 
The principle of impartiality implies essentially two things: non-discrimination, 
such that all persons are equal in suffering, without regard to which “side” they 
belong to, or once they are combatants, what their status has been in the conflict; 
and, proportionality, which is a distributional principle implying that between 
persons assistance shall be allocated to their degree of need, with priority being 
given to those whose need is the greatest. Furthermore, impartiality implies the 
removal of all subjective discrimination, i.e. non-distinction between persons 
even of the same group, on any basis, other than need (Ranganathan, 2006: 
203).  
 
The ICRC definition of neutrality has two components: ideological neutrality and 
non-participation in hostilities (Leader, 2000: 22). In a traditional understanding of 
neutrality, aid must not take sides and it must remain equally distant from all 
parties and actors involved. In other words, neutrality requires aid to ensure that 
the economy is not benefiting in any significant way: more “do no good” than “do 
not harm” (Scholms, 2003: 46). According to the principle of neutrality, 
humanitarian agencies should make no distinction between good wars and bad 
wars, between just and unjust causes, or even between aggressors and 
innocents. Included in this principle are military neutrality, taking no sides in 
hostilities; political neutrality, and not engaging in controversies of a political, 
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racial, religious, or ideological nature. While the principle of impartiality allows 
humanitarian agencies to speak publicly during a conflict as long as they apply 
equal terms to all warring parties, neutrality actually demands that agencies 
remain silent and abstain from the politics of a crisis (Fox, 2001: 277). 
 
The principle of independence requires humanitarian action to be dissociated 
from political, financial, or military pressures. This appears straightforward but 
actually has been the least realised for most humanitarian agencies because 
budgetary constraints, concurrent government initiatives, the primacy of military 
relief have often called for these agencies to act with a certain degree of 
cohesion with, and even supervision of the government and the military 
(Ranganathan, 2006: 203). 
 
Humanitarian principles can be seen as a deal whereby the warring parties to a 
conflict agree to respect humanitarian principles and humanitarians will not 
interfere in the conflict. Thus, the principles of humanitarian action are in a sense 
dependent on broader humanitarian principles. However, several developments 
have led to the questioning of this ethical framework. Most importantly, in many 
current CPEs the warring parties appear to have rejected the very notion that war 
has limits. Direct attacks on civilians and other IHL abuses are often a deliberate 
strategy. Furthermore, aid has been accused of exacerbating and prolonging 
conflicts. This has led to the questioning of the applicability of traditional 
humanitarian principles in modern CPEs (Leader, 2000: 2). 
 
2.3.2. Neo-humanitarianism 
The development of forms of conflict in which belligerents have little or no 
respect for humanitarian principles; the retreat of the international security 
system from many parts in the world; and the growth in size and number of 
humanitarian agencies have made the implementation of humanitarian principles 
very difficult. In genocidal or ethnically driven conflicts, the very idea of universal 
humanity, or that war has limits, is denied by the belligerents. In a situation where 
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attacks on civilians are the objective, merely delivering aid to civilians is 
perceived as a political rather than humanitarian act, as it frequently runs counter 
to factional objectives. Impartiality is difficult at the local level where access is 
denied. At the global level, donor priorities skew resources towards areas of 
security concerns away from countries in much greater need. Independence is 
increasingly difficult now that many agencies are dependent on government 
funding. Governments increasingly appear to want to use aid as part of a broader 
foreign policy goal. Furthermore, division and competition between agencies 
makes their manipulation that much easier. The essential point is that, in this 
changed context, adhering to humanitarian principles is considered by many 
agencies to be inappropriate, maybe even impossible (Leader, 2000: 21). 
  
The changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era has resulted in many 
humanitarian agencies questioning the traditional principles of humanitarian 
action. Where belligerents refuse to acknowledge the limits of war, many 
humanitarian agencies are questioning whether they should still respect the 
conditions imposed on them by these principles (Leader, 2000: 15).  
 
The paradoxes of humanitarian relief and the role it may play in fuelling conflict 
are all too evident. A second set of factors further undermines classical 
humanitarianism’s basis of moral incontestability: that providing humanitarian aid 
during situations of armed conflict is always a good thing. Humanitarian agencies 
and relief operations no longer occupy the moral high ground as criticisms from 
academics, journalists and relief workers themselves have multiplied since the 
1990s. A commitment to participate only in relief work, without paying heed to the 
political milieu or other factors, often undercuts the importance of human rights. 
Viewing aid as conditioned not on the right of the victims, but on their needs is 
disempowering them in the long-term. In addition, in situations where one party is 
at fault, not questioning, publicising or openly condemning its policies does little 
to either discourage its activities or avert a destructive cycle of retaliation from 
setting in (Ranganathan, 2006: 204-205).  
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Neo-humanitarianism bears little resemblance to the classical version or its 
ideals, apart from the basic commitment to relief work. It is principled, ethical and 
human rights based. It will withhold aid if to deliver it could prolong conflict and 
undermine human rights. It rejects the traditional humanitarian principle of 
neutrality as on the one hand morally repugnant, and on the other hand, 
unachievable in the CPEs. The principles of neutrality and independence have 
been more or less expressly sidelined by most agencies in a number of crises. 
Impartiality in the distribution of aid has also received a blow as humanitarian 
agencies have been pressured to provide their services to one side when they 
are unable to correspond with the other (Ranganathan, 2006: 207). 
 
From the point of view of absolute morality it could be argued that it does not 
matter if aid influences a war. Humanitarian aid, it could be reasoned, should be 
judged by its moral rather than its practical impact: it is simply the right thing to 
do and that is enough; aid is a value not a policy. Although this absolute moral 
concept was the implicit underpinning of humanitarianism for many years, today 
few humanitarian agencies cling to this position. Many agencies take the view 
that ethical responsibility now means that they must somehow judge the net 
benefit of their work. According to Leader, This is a significant development in the 
philosophy of humanitarianism “as it represents the introduction of a utilitarian 
ethic into what was hitherto an absolute morality” (Leader, 2000: 22). 
 
In the new moral, human rights culture of international politics, the whole notion 
of neutrality has become more and more controversial. Neo-humanitarianism 
sees war as a moral violation and key barrier to development and rejects the 
ICRC’s view that war is inevitable. For these agencies, humanitarian action 
should be seized on as a tool to promote peace and justice. Today, neutrality is 
seen as undesirable, because it is either considered amoral (remaining silent in 
the face of human rights abuses), or the central role of INGOs in CPEs make it 
impossible to achieve (Fox, 2001: 277).  This has resulted in humanitarian 
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agencies adopting a human rights based approach to humanitarian action in 
CPEs. 
 
The development of a rights-based approach to humanitarian issues is often 
located in INGO responses to the Biafran famine in 1968 wherein the ICRC’s 
doctrine of neutrality and silence was questioned. Many INGOs working in the 
field argued that breaking from this position “was the only ethical way of assisting 
the population”. As a result, in 1971, one of its leading critics, Bernard Koucher, 
established Medicine Sans Frontier. This organisation has since symbolised the 
rebellious humanitarian cause. In a public statement they have said that they “are 
not sure that words can always save lives, but we know that silence can certainly 
kill”. The shift from a needs based to a rights-based framework in many ways 
reflects the deeper notion of humanitarianism that includes both protection and 
assistance activities and is a human rights-based humanitarianism (Siebert, 
2003: 64-65). 
 
Impartiality implies that humanitarian action should reach all conflict victims, no 
matter where they are, or which side they support. According to this principle, 
humanitarian response should be guided by need alone, and that there should be 
no distinction between “good” and “bad” beneficiaries. Yet by subordinating 
humanitarian objectives to political and strategic ones, some victims may be 
seen as more deserving than others, and impartiality is forgone. For instance, the 
level of humanitarian response in Serbia in the second half of 1999 was much 
lower than in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. These differences did not 
correspond to different levels of need. Few donors were willing to fund 
humanitarian assistance in Serbia, and few INGOs were willing to face the 
difficulties of working there, and therefore chose the more prominent and 
politically correct Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro (Curtis, 2001: 
13).  
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Furthermore, in many conflicts, the fact that aid cannot be offered across both 
sides is not always an argument for withdrawing it completely. Some agencies 
see impartiality only as a desirable goal, not an absolute condition 
(Ranganathan, 2006: 210). This is especially problematic when considered in 
conjunction with the watering down of considerations about neutrality. Critiques 
of neo-humanitarianism have noted that neutrality is essential to ensuring access 
to people in need. Thus, the rejection of the principle of neutrality has had an 
adverse effect on the principle of impartiality whereby needs of victims of war are 
no longer a prerequisite for the delivery of humanitarian aid (Kent, 2004: 865). 
 
The principle of independence contradicts the growing coherence between 
political objectives and humanitarian aid. Many humanitarian agencies remain 
dependent on financial support from major donor states, thus violating the 
independence principle (Curtis, 2001: 13). With the increase in the number of 
humanitarian crises, budgets have naturally expanded, making obtainment of 
funding a matter of great concern. Leaning on states for greater contributions 
reduces the independence of humanitarian agencies, for their involvement may 
be modified as per their donor states’ wishes (Ranganathan, 2007: 211). Without 
independence, humanitarian assistance cannot legitimately assert itself as the 
moral counterforce vis-à-vis the belligerents, and impartial action is made more 
difficult (Curtis, 2001: 13).   
 
Neo-humanitarianism goes beyond the traditional humanitarian mandate and 
objectives by including activities that fosters development and rehabilitation; 
protects and cultivates respect for human rights; and implements peace-building 
initiatives. This approach has been labelled as the relief-to-development 
continuum. 
 
2.3.3. The Relief-to-Development Continuum 
Closely linked to the new human rights-based humanitarianism is the concept of 
developmental relief. During the Cold War, relief and development were 
 35
considered to be distinct and discrete. However, the protracted and complex 
nature of many of today’s wars has forced humanitarians to rethink the link 
between the two. From the late 1980s onwards, many agencies began to think 
beyond straightforward relief, and of their interventions based on how they could 
contribute to long-term, sustainable development, as well as promoting the 
prospects for positive peace and justice. There clearly is a broad trend towards 
an increase in the use of humanitarian assistance as part of a more 
comprehensive strategy to transform conflicts and decrease violence. The trend 
is partly a response to the accusation that humanitarian assistance can prolong 
war and exacerbate conflict (Fox, 2001: 279). Driven by concerns about relief 
creating dependence; sometimes doing harm and failing to address root causes 
of emergencies despite its high cost; pursuit of both relief and development has 
become a dominant paradigm among humanitarian agencies in CPEs. A third 
objective of peace-building has emerged, along with the logic that development 
can itself help prevent or resolve conflict and sustain peace (Cliffe and White, 
2000: 314).  
 
The idea that relief and development should be mutually reinforcing was 
launched into the mainstream of humanitarian affairs in 1991 with UN General 
Assembly Resolution 46/182 (Cliffe and White, 2000: 316). According to this 
resolution: 
 
“Emergency assistance must be provided in ways that will be 
supportive of recovery and long-term development [and] 
international cooperation and support for rehabilitation and 
reconstruction should continue with sustained intensity after 
the initial relief stage” (UN, 1991b). 
 
Developmental relief marks a fundamental shift from traditional humanitarian 
principles. Unlike traditional humanitarianism, which had a minimal aim of saving 
lives, developmental neo-humanitarianism questions the long-term 
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consequences of intervening to save lives (Fox, 2001: 28). According to Hugo 
Slim, a new humanitarianism has developed that bases actions (or inactions) on 
the presumed good or bad consequences of a given intervention in relation to 
wider developmental aims (Slim, 1997). Relief and development constitutes the 
poles of a continuum, the centre ground of which is occupied by rehabilitation 
(Cliffe and White, 2000: 315). This development has made the relief-to-
development continuum the principle approach of humanitarian agencies 
operating in CPEs. 
 
The basic objectives of development policy are: a sound policy framework 
encouraging stable, growing economies with full scope for a vigorous private 
sector and an adequate fiscal base; investment in social development, especially 
education, primary health care, and population activities; enhanced participation 
of all people, and notably women, in economic and political life, and the reduction 
of social inequalities; good governance and public management, democratic 
accountability, the protection of human rights and the rule of law; sustained 
environmental practices; and addressing root causes of potential conflicts, 
limiting military expenditure, and targeting reconstruction and peace-building 
efforts towards longer term reconciliation and development (Wood, 2001).  
 
The relief-to-development approach to humanitarian aid is premised on the 
notion that including developmental and rehabilitation activities within the relief 
mandate will ameliorate the root causes of violence. In other words, the relief-to-
development continuum will address the causes of structural and direct violence 
and will usher in positive peace. 
 
The relief-to-development continuum is a non-linear process as both relief 
activities and development programmes can take place at the same time. 
Furthermore, the distinction between relief and development is not always clear 
cut. Many forms of aid inhabit the grey area between relief, development and 
peace-building. For instance, support for livelihoods, especially agricultural 
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livelihoods. Sometimes this is included in the broadened definition of relief. The 
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), for example, has a Special Relief 
Operations Service which provides what it calls agricultural relief (seeds, tools, 
fertilisers, livestock and veterinary supplies, and fighting gear) on an emergency 
short-term basis in order to restore assets and food production. Rather than an 
effort to restore agricultural systems to normal, this may simply be a temporary 
stop gap, and so does not fit neatly into either relief or rehabilitation categories. 
Food can result in relief when used for immediate survival support, or 
rehabilitation when used to enable herd recovery, or development when used in 
a food-for-work or school feeding programme, or all three at once. Rehabilitation 
of port facilities or roads to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid may logically 
fall into relief, but may well be developmental. When considering the difficulties 
inherent in assigning the diverse forms of aid intervention to one or other of the 
categories of relief, rehabilitation, development or peace-building, it becomes 
clear that these definitions can be more meaningfully applied to objectives or 
outcomes of aid programming rather than its content or modalities. A given form 
of intervention can further more than one outcome (Cliffe and White, 2000: 323). 
 
The relief-to-development continuum was developed to address the perceived 
perverse effects that aid may have within the context of CPEs. The human rights 
based approach and the relief-to-development continuum complement each 
other as both methods attempt to ameliorate the negative effects of humanitarian 
relief as well as address the root causes of CPEs.  
 
2.4.   Humanitarian INGOs 
The group of humanitarian actors that increased most substantially in the past 
fifty years is the non-governmental community (Heyse, 2003: 178). Humanitarian 
INGOs have emerged to play an increasingly significant role in multilateral 
humanitarian operations, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The activities 
of humanitarian INGOs now cut across all phases of the peacekeeping process, 
from advocates and advisors to governments and international organisations; to 
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close contact in field operations; to unintentional but very real sources of conflict 
in contested settings. INGOs have become significant players in all aspects of so 
called second-generation peacekeeping operations from early warning to peace-
building initiatives (Abiew and Keating, 1999: 89).  
 
The INGO sector has evolved through processes of institutionalisation of 
humanitarian principles and action. The performance of the INGO sector differed 
substantially from the performance of international organisations. INGOs 
responded more rapidly and innovatively in humanitarian crises. This has helped 
the sector gain legitimacy among donor governments and the public, which led to 
an increase in funding, facilitating the development and professionalisation of this 
sector (Heyse, 2003: 178). However, the protracted nature of contemporary 
intrastate conflicts has raised doubts pertaining to the effectiveness of INGOs 
operating in CPEs. These concerns relate to problems to do with accountability, 
transparency, institutional amnesia and lack of local knowledge, problems with 
monitoring and evaluation, and aid that fuels the war economy.  
 
The increased presence of INGOs operating within CPEs is a reflection of the 
relative growth in resources that they command and the growing relevance of 
their activities in CPEs. The expansion of resources has been fostered by two 
converging developments: the increase in proportion of donor government 
funding for development assistance that has been channelled through INGOs; 
and the increased amount of development assistance funds directed to 
humanitarian relief operations (Abiew and Keating, 1999: 92). 
 
According to Duffield, relief in war zones provides a metaphor for the post-Cold 
War era, because external relief is concerned with the changing role of 
governments and the increasing importance of subcontracting public functions to 
private firms or NGOs. By the mid-1980s, a noticeable change in donor funding 
policy had occurred, from direct donor assistance to recognised governments, in 
favour of international support for private, INGO sectors. According to this view, 
 39
the involvement of INGOs in offering humanitarian assistance would not have 
been possible without the growth of subcontracting. In its essential form, this 
involves donor governments contracting out their aid programmes to INGOs 
(Duffield, 1997: 527-533).  
 
Within this subcontracting arrangement, lines of funding and accountability 
usually reside between donors and the INGOs concerned (Duffield, 1997: 533). 
Towards the end of the 1980s, Western governments were channelling 
significant levels of resources through INGOs. Structures of host governments 
suffering from CPEs were habitually rendered ineffective as a result of the 
conflict in that they did not cover areas of the country controlled by rebel groups 
or, within those areas of rebel control, could not be relied upon to distribute 
assistance fairly to those in need. As a result, the humanitarian system was 
forced to make greater use of INGOs as implementing partners and increasingly 
INGOs entered contractual relief delivery relationships with the UN and donor 
governments (Apthorpe, Borton and Woods, 2001: 9). Subcontracting has also 
allowed donor states to distance themselves from the CPEs in the periphery. The 
extent to which individual INGOs are dependent on donor funding can vary. 
However, within large emergency operations, such as OLS, donor funding is 
critical (Duffield, 1997: 533). Subcontracting has raised concerns pertaining to 
the accountability of INGOs offering humanitarian assistance. Are INGOs 
accountable to their donors, their board of trustees, or their beneficiaries? This 
division of accountability brings into question the effectiveness and motives of 
INGOs (Pugh, 1998; Scholms, 2003; Efuk, 2000). 
  
Negotiated access has become the principle means of expanding welfare safety 
nets in internal wars. Basically this entails gaining the consent of warring parties 
for the movement and delivery of humanitarian aid to civilian populations 
(Duffield, 1997: 534). In order to gain access to civilian victims, INGOs must 
dabble in diplomacy as they negotiate with warring parties to guarantee the safe 
passage of relief food, medicine and equipment. To gain access to those in need, 
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they have been forced to negotiate with the perpetrators of violence. In the 
process, humanitarian INGOs have been coerced into making concessions, 
ranging form recognition in the case of Southern Sudanese rebels, to provisions 
of vehicles to armed intermediaries who deliver food in Somalia. INGOs are 
caught in a quandary: to be allowed to feed the civilians who are virtually held 
hostage by the warring parties they have made provisions for the belligerents 
too; and to gain access to civilians under the control of rebel and government 
forces, they have to strike a deals with some of the most notorious warlords in 
the world (Okumu, 2003: 121). Negotiated access has become the principle 
means of establishing internationally mandated relief operations that cover all 
sides in an ongoing conflict. It has provided a framework within which integrated 
multi-sectoral humanitarian programmes have been created. While remaining 
operationally problematic, it has legitimised cross-border type programmes that 
were formerly out of bound for most agencies. An early example of this approach 
was the UN’s OLS (Duffield, 1997: 534).  
 
Unlike many for-profit firms, INGOs are not obliged to make public their financial 
or assessment reports. This has raised doubts concerning their transparency. 
Humanitarian organisations seek to discourage consumer feedback from 
beneficiaries, because any doubt that is expressed with regard to a certain 
practice or approach potentially weakens an agency’s position towards donors. 
However, INGOs do report on the positive results of their aid programmes, but 
these results are often exaggerated in order to improve INGOs’ standing with 
donors. This suggests that INGOs are more likely to satisfy the needs of donors 
than their beneficiaries (Efuk, 2000: 62).  
 
It is crucial for INGOs to understand the political environment in which they act in 
order to address the problems and obstacles they are confronted with in their 
humanitarian work. However, the capacity to analyse the political context of aid is 
often described as the weakest link in humanitarianism. Three basic observations 
can be made that suggest a lack of analytical capacity among INGOs. First, it is 
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in the very nature of humanitarianism to be reactive; it is purely a response to the 
needs of a population. Therefore, humanitarian staff has to cope with fast-
evolving ad hoc situations that hardly leave time for reflection that limits their 
capacity to gather knowledge. Second, high staff turnover is a characteristic of 
the vast majority of aid organisations. It is difficult to find senior aid workers who 
have spent all their working lives in one single institution. Finally, the 
unwillingness to dedicate financial resources in order to store and diffuse 
knowledge hits at the fundamental obstacle to learning processes inside 
humanitarianism: the perception of responsibility (Schloms, 2003: 50). In 
addition, INGOs often argue that every crisis is unique. To a certain extent, this 
point is legitimate, but each crisis involves a similar set of aid institutions (UN, 
ICRC, INGOs) that have to deal with a similar set of problems and obstacles 
(Schloms, 2003: 48-49). 
 
Within the INGO sector, monitoring and evaluation capabilities present a difficult 
challenge. The financial measures that exist for the for-profit sector are explicitly 
not useful here, since INGOs are not in the business of increasing revenue and 
maximising shareholder value. Harder still, is to attribute any element of societal 
change to the activities of a specific organisation. Furthermore, INGOs do not 
adhere to any professional code of conduct that might be used to assess them, 
nor do they have the kind of professional output that can be easily tested or 
published (Dail and Spar, 2002: 176). However, by implementing the “do no 
harm” approach, INGOs are able to identify the specific relief programmes that 
are ineffective or even those that exacerbate the situation by strengthening 
dividers between communities. Thus, in order for INGOs to be effective they 
must be able to identify unsuccessful programmes and avoid making the same 
mistakes in the future. Thus, the “do no harm” approach can be utilised as a 
method to evaluate the effectiveness of INGOs (Anderson, 2004). 
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2.5. Enhancing the Quality of Humanitarian INGOs 
The prolonged nature of contemporary intra-state conflicts has made INGOs 
realise their limitations to improve the lives of victims by only providing immediate 
relief. Depending on their analysis of root causes of conflict, various INGOs 
began to combine service delivery with other activities, including advocacy work, 
development and poverty reduction, and peace-building. Furthermore, internal 
and external pressures, and technical and political factors led to demands for 
better performance and increased accountability of humanitarian responses. 
Several new initiatives have developed in recent years. Some humanitarian 
agencies want to move towards greater standardisation and regulation, whereas 
other agencies place priority on the aspect of learning, retaining flexibility, and 
innovative approaches. Three prominent initiatives have come to the fore: the 
Sphere project, the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance 
(ANLAP), and the “do no harm approach” (Griekspoor and Sondorp, 2001: 209-
210). Within the context of OLS, INGOs adopted the “do no harm” approach in an 
attempt to increase their efficiency. 
 
The Sphere project came into being because of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. 
The evaluation done in its aftermath coincided with a drive to find ways to 
improve INGO performance and establish means of accountability. The result 
was a Handbook of Minimum Standards; a Humanitarian charter; the adoption of 
the Red Cross Codes of Conduct by participating INGOs; and the establishment 
of the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project – now the Humanitarian Accountability 
Project International (Tong, 2004: 176). Sphere has been criticised for being too 
prescriptive, leaving little room for contextual adaptation. Many of the defined 
technical standards, interventions and key indicators are minimalist and only 
applicable in an ideal refugee and displacement camp (Tong, 2004: 182). Four 
prerequisites need to be met for Sphere minimum standards to be applicable: 
everyone involved in humanitarian assistance should share a common goal; 
there should be access to the affected population; sufficient funds should be 
available; and everyone should be committed to meet minimum standards. In 
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Sudan, none of these underlying assumptions were met, which suggests that 
INGOs could not effectively implement the standards proposed by Sphere 
(Griekspoor and Collins, 2001: 741). 
 
However, it is important to note that the use of standards is much broader than 
Sphere. Individual agencies have elaborate manuals, policies and instructions 
regarding a large range of aspects of their work. Country specific coordination 
and agreements have been developed to better understand and adapt to the 
specific political context of a CPE. For example, the Sudan Ground Rules and 
Letters of Understanding are examples of a country specific agreement on 
standards (Hilhorst, 2002: 201). 
 
ALNAP was established as a forum to promote learning in the humanitarian 
sector. It is a unique forum in which a wide variety of topics have been taken 
forward. Among others, the network maintains a database of evaluation reports 
and related publications on accountability or participation of beneficiaries 
(Griekspoor and Sondorp, 2001: 211). 
 
The “do no harm approach” is premised on the recognition that aid can prolong 
war. The “do no harm” principles allows agencies to analyse how their activities 
may positively or negatively influence conflict resolution (Grikspoor and Sondorp, 
2001: 211). This approach offers a framework for INGO to prevent them from 
doing harm when delivering aid. Firstly, should aid have a negative effect, this 
approach proposes that INGOs retract their assistance. By identifying the relief 
activities that can exacerbate conflict, INGOs can and should avoid those 
activities. Secondly, international assistance can worsen conflict when it 
reinforces inter-group divisions and tensions, and when it undermines and 
weakens inter-group connections. However, it can promote peace when it 
reduces inter-group divisions, and when it supports and strengthens inter-group 
connections. Thirdly, it is in the details of an aid programme that its impacts 
either reinforce divisions or connectors. Programme decisions about whether to 
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provide aid, where to work, when and for how long, who to hire locally, who to 
target, and how to deliver goods. All affect the inter-group relations in the areas 
where aid is delivered. Finally, aid programmes that stay only at the individual or 
personal level, without translation into institutional impacts at the socio-political 
level, has no discernable impact on peace. Aid delivery that focuses on more 
people cannot, by itself, achieve sufficient momentum to end conflict or build 
peace; nor can work concentrated only on key people. For effectiveness, efforts 
to engage more people in peace practice must also link to efforts involving key 
people and vice versa (Anderson, 2004). 
 
The “do no harm” approach has gained immense popularity within the 
humanitarian sector, and is regarded as being the best approach to delivering 
aid. On the other hand, the Sphere principles have been described as being too 
rigid and unrealistic. The prerequisites necessary for the Sphere principles to be 
implemented have never been present in CPEs. Furthermore, by adhering to 
these principles INGOs may lose one of their greatest advantages: their 
operational flexibility. The “do no harm” approach identifies tangible forms of 
measurement and places realistic responsibilities on INGOs operating within an 
extremely complex environment. This approach has become the dominant 
methodology of humanitarian agencies, whereby they ensure that at the very 
minimum, aid does not make thing worse (Anderson, 2004; Fox, 2001: 279-280).  
 
2.6.   Conclusion 
The nature of post-Cold War CPEs necessitated the evolution of humanitarian 
assistance from traditional ICRC humanitarianism to neo-humanitarianism, which 
advocates a rights-based relief-to-development approach to humanitarian 
assistance. Furthermore, this approach advocates that humanitarian agencies 
should be knowledgeable about the potential harmful effects their programmes 
may have within the local context, by adopting a “do no harm” approach. 
 
 45
The main factors, which drove this change in the international humanitarian 
regime, were the changing nature of state sovereignty; the changing nature of 
warfare and CPEs; the expansion of the concept of security to include human 
security; and the withdrawal of diplomacy from the periphery by Western 
governments. These developments enabled a multitude of humanitarian actors to 
gain access to war-affected population within a sovereign state. Furthermore, 
traditional humanitarianism appeared to be ineffective in addressing the multitude 
of problems, which humanitarian agencies had to face when delivering relief 
within the context of CPEs. Thus, neo-humanitarianism, which focused on human 
rights and development, became the dominant approach to humanitarian 
programming.  
 
Since 1994, humanitarian agencies, including INGOs, operating under the OLS 
mandate adopted the relief-to-development approach to humanitarian 
assistance. The rational behind this approach was that it would prevent 
dependency on external relief; and that self-sufficiency and development would 
contribute to the peace-building process. 
 
The criticisms levelled against INGOs during the 1990s encouraged them to 
adopt a “do no harm” approach, which should have theoretically prevented them 
from fuelling conflict within the context of a CPE. INGOs adopted this approach in 
the Sudan in order to protect human rights and to prevent relief from being 
diverted to the military and economic aims of warring parties. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN PROTRACTED EMERGENCIES: A CASE 
STUDY OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The establishment of OLS in 1989 was an innovative approach to an integrated 
relief programme. It was the first operation of its kind where the international 
community delivered aid in an active civil war, in order to assist IDPs and war 
affected populations. OLS set the precedent for many relief operations in the 
post-Cold War era. However, it has remained distinct as, unlike most 
humanitarian operations in the 1990s, OLS was an informal or negotiated safe 
area programme, which did not depend on calling into effect Chapter VII, or on 
military protection for humanitarian aid and IDPs. 
 
Sudan is an excellent example of a CPE, which explains the choice of the 
ground-breaking and modern international humanitarian intervention known as 
OLS. Furthermore, the evolution of OLS reflected the various changes which 
took place in the humanitarian system since 1989: international intervention 
during an ongoing conflict; the link between humanitarianism and human rights; 
the relief-to-development continuum; the expansion of the concept of human 
security; an increase of subcontracting relief functions to INGOs; and diplomatic 
negotiations and agreements between the UN and armed opposition movements. 
 
This chapter evaluates how OLS was designed and how it evolved over time to 
reflect the changing nature of conflict and developments within the international 
humanitarian system. The underlying motives for choosing the OLS framework 
will be studied, and the reasons for the various changes during OLS’ existence 
will be evaluated. This will be done by evaluating the origins of the civil war and 
the war induced famine in Sudan; by studying the main phases of OLS; and the 
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differing contractual and operational humanitarian relief environment between the 
Northern and Southern sectors of Sudan. 
 
3.2. The Origins of Sudan’s Civil War 
Sudan is Africa’s largest country. (Robinson, 2002: 49). The country is sparsely 
populated, with some 24 million people spread over nearly 1 million square miles 
(Deng and Minear, 1992: 13).  Sudan is populated in the North mainly by Islamic 
people, roughly half of whom consider themselves to be Arabs. In the South, the 
population is made up largely of non-Arab, non-Muslim African peoples, such as 
the Dinka and Nuer, who adhere to Christian or traditional beliefs (Robinson, 
2002: 49) 
 
The conflict between Northern and Southern Sudan has usually been 
misunderstood, because its historical roots have been misrepresented. Two 
explanations are usually given for the continuing division: that the division 
between North and South is based on centuries of exploitation and slave-raiding 
by the Arab North against the African South; or that Sudan was artificially split by 
imperialists meddling (Johnson, 2003: 1).  
 
Sudan entered the 21st century caught up in not one, but many civil wars. What 
was seen in the 1980s as a war between North and South, Muslim against 
Christian, Arab against African, has, after decades of violence, broken the 
bounds of any North-South conflict. Fighting had spread into areas outside of 
Southern Sudan and beyond Sudan’s borders. Not only were Muslims fighting 
Muslims, but Africans were also fighting Africans. A war being fought over scares 
resources was being waged for the total control of abundant oil resources 
(Johnson, 2003: xiii). The people of Sudan had known only a single decade of 
peace since independence in 1956 (Bradbury et al. 2000). The fact that the 
overall civil war continued for so long, far outlasting the international and regional 
political arrangements, which at one time seemed to direct and define it, was 
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testimony to the intractability of the underlying causes of the conflict (Johnson, 
2003: xiii). 
 
The origins of the war can be traced back to the nineteenth century when the 
Egyptian conquest of Northern Sudan changed the nature of existing forms of 
taxation and land rights, opening new opportunities for the economic exploitation 
of the people of the South by the people of the North who had since become 
Muslim trough trade and other contact with the Middle East (Ntata, 1999). 
 
The causes of the current conflicts, however, appeared to be closely connected 
with the process of independence. Independence in Southern Sudan was 
premised on the condition of the devolution of considerable administrative and 
political powers to the South. However, the Southern Sudanese formed their own 
Federal Bloc in 1957 after the North had rejected the federal system of 
government immediately following independence from Britain. The imposition of 
a policy of Arabisation and Islamisation in the South by the military government 
of the North resulted in a Southern rebellion, which escalated into full-scale civil 
war in the 1960s. Economic hardships during the 1970s and 80s increased the 
North’s interest in the oil rich Southern areas, fuelling the confrontation between 
the two sides (Ntata, 1999).  
 
The first civil war, fought between southern rebels known as Anyanya and a 
succession of northern governments, was brought to an end with the 1972 Addis 
Ababa Agreement, which provided measures of autonomy to the Sudan’s 
southern regions. The failure of the Jaafar Nimeiri government to uphold the 
autonomy agreement, and of southern politicians to agree on power-sharing, 
resulted in the country sliding back into hostilities between government forces 
and southern rebels, reconstituted as Anyanya II. Government proposals to 
abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement by re-dividing the South provoked a mutiny 
of southern officers in May 1983 and the start of the second civil war (Bradbury et 
al. 2000). 
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The multiplicity of causes, which led to the Sudan’s civil wars, was indicative of 
the complex nature of the conflict. Patterns of governance in Sudan, established 
an exploitive relationship between the central government in the North and the 
peripheries in the South, mainly through the institutions of slavery and slave 
raiding, creating groups of people with a lasting ambiguous status in relation to 
the state. The introduction of a specific brand of Islam further divided the people 
between those with full legal rights and those without. Furthermore, the northern 
government confronted the issues of Sudan’s diversity and unequal development 
by attempting to establish a national identity based on the principles of Arab 
culture and Islam, which solidified divisions between the North and the South. 
Inequalities in economic, education and political development within the colonial 
state were not readdressed by Britain before granting Sudan independence in 
1956. These inequalities have been perpetuated in the South by successive 
northern governments. Neither the North nor the South was able to obtain a 
national consensus in the 1970s concerning national unity, regional 
development, and the balance of power between the central and regional 
governments (Johnson, 2003: xviii-xix). 
 
The re-emergence of the 1983 war is located in the political and economic crisis 
in Northern Sudan in the 1970s, and an alliance of northern commercial, 
government and military interests whose prosperity depended on their ability to 
tap the land, mineral and human resources of the South. The expansion of 
mechanised farming and the extraction of oil discovered in 1978 on the North-
South border required a cheap labour force and the dismantling of the southern 
subsistence economy (Bradbury et al. 2000). Sudan’s involvement in the 
international politics of the Cold War exacerbated its own internal war through the 
distribution of arms on an unprecedented scale. The interests of foreign 
governments and investors in the country’s natural resources, especially oil, 
contributed to destabilising the already fragile situation (Johnson, 2003: xix). 
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There are clear links between the first and the second wars, in particular, the 
structural subordination of Southern Sudan and the adjacent areas within the 
Sudanese state. However, the second civil war and the way it was fought are 
distinct from that of the 1960s. The SPLM/A is a very different organisation from 
Anyanya I. The SPLM/A was formed in Ethiopia under the patronage of President 
Mengistu, with Colonel John Garang taking overall command of the SPLM/A. 
This organisation is also only one, albeit the most prominent, of several southern 
rebel groups and the war encompassed several smaller but damaging internal 
conflicts (Bradbury et al., 2000).  
 
Unlike many civil wars in Africa, Sudan still had a functioning central government. 
However, this government did not have an effective monopoly over the use of 
force over all of its territory. In the Southern areas, the SPLM/A had effective and 
long-lasting control over large swaths of territory. This long-lasting control and 
the SPLM/A’s cooperation and formal relations with INGOs and IGOs through 
OLS conveyed a “de facto state” identity on the armed opposition (Vinci, 2006: 
10).  
 
The northern Arab minority essentially employed divide and rule tactics to 
suppress rebellion among the black majority in the South. This strategy was 
mainly achieved through GoS policy of using politically restive militias to fight the 
SPLM/A and destabilise the South (Ntata, 1999).  
 
The civil war in the Sudan is an excellent example of a low-intensity intra-state 
war, especially in terms of the effect of conflict on civilians: belligerents employed 
scored earth tactics and deliberately targeted civilians; violence against civilians 
was excessive and terror tactics against civilians were used as part of the war 
strategy; these tactics resulted in mass population movements and IDPs; the 
distinction between civilians and belligerents was difficult, if not impossible, to 
distinguish;  and a major objective of the war was to gain access to resources. 
Furthermore, the destruction of civilians’ livelihoods was a deliberate strategy, 
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which combined with severe drought, resulted in a devastating famine in the 
country, described among others as a “war induced famine”. 
 
For five years, the war raged virtually unnoticed internationally. Then in 1988, a 
major famine – triggered by the combined effects of drought and conflict – 
occurred in northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, in the eastern part of Southern Sudan. 
Despite the existing news blackout, the international media did pick up the story 
and covered the famine, which is estimated to have killed approximately 250, 000 
people (Levine, 1997). 
 
3.3.   War Induced Famine in Sudan 
The causes of famine were not limited to poverty and government failure to 
provide food when there was an acute shortage, or to solicit relief from the 
international community. Both hunger and its roots in poverty could be attributed 
to a complex combination of political, economic, and environmental factors that 
had a negative effect on productivity, distribution, and the sustainability of life 
(Deng and Minear, 1992: 38). Since international emergency relief originated 
outside the country, it existence implied that the national government had failed 
to provide for the survival of its citizens and therefore should have been held 
accountable to its citizens. These issues not only touch on the central values of 
sovereignty but also go to the core of the national purpose and legitimacy of the 
government. These factors came into focus dramatically in Sudan. The political 
dimensions were critical in delaying the detection of and the reaction to the 
emergency (Deng and Minear, 1992: 45). 
 
The way the war was fought is directly linked to the pursuit of long-term 
economic objectives in Sudan. The war economy of both the government and the 
guerrillas involved, in different degrees, the capture of labour, as much as the 
capture of territory. The pattern of the war suggests that resource depletion and 
economic subjugation were the objectives, not just incidental consequences. 
Populations stripped of their assets were deprived of economic independence. 
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Destruction of displaced settlements around Khartoum, and forcible relocations 
of displaced persons to schemes and peace villages around Wau and Juba, or in 
Upper Nile, the Nuba Mountains and along the Ethiopian borderlands had 
produced a dependent and portable labour reserve that served a double 
purpose: to implement the government’s programme through resettling and 
reclaiming territory formerly contested by the SPLM/A; and to extend political and 
economic control over the resources of these areas through agricultural schemes 
owned and operated by interest groups represented in the army and government. 
The economic strategy of the SPLM/A was far less clearly focused. 
Concentrations of displaced peoples had been used to attract relief resources, 
which were absorbed into the SPLM/A war economy (Johnson, 2003: 145-146). 
 
Violent attacks on civilians and the destruction of their livelihoods were part of the 
GoS and the SPLM/A war strategies. Since 1991, the SPLM/A was forced to 
depend on the civilian population of the South for support. This encouraged the 
GoS to deliberately target civilians in the South, usually by employing the 
services of government militias, in an attempt to destroy the SPLM/A’s civilian 
support base. The SPLM/A denied access of relief to government-held garrison 
towns in an attempt to starve out the government forces. Furthermore, the 
SPLM/A were implicated in revenge attacks on civilian populations, which were 
regarded as supporting the GoS or government militias (Rhodes, 2002).  
 
The use of terror and violence against civilians had a significant influence on the 
socio-political milieu of Sudan. The results of such tactics were the erosion of 
traditional values caused by a breakdown of community structures; the 
marginalisation of traditional authorities; the destruction of the judicial system; a 
strain on economic resources and kinship ties; the general culture of violence 
that prolonged warfare creates; and the destruction of traditional famine coping 
strategies (Levine, 1997: 8). 
 
 53
Three principle stages can be identified in the genesis of the famine in the Sudan 
from 1986 to the period when the international community launched OLS in 1989 
(Efuk, 2000: 47). The first stage, which ran from January to December 1986, saw 
an intensification of the war, including the SPLM/A attacks on government-held 
garrison towns (Bradbury et al. 2000), and increases in the use of militia forces 
by the government. Throughout the year, the SPLM/A’s opinion of relief was 
obdurately antagonistic. The war strategies and policies adopted by the 
belligerents were imperative in causing the famine. Both the government and the 
SPLM/A denied food to the civilian population in the war zones. The policies of 
denying relief did not create the famine, but it made it much more severe when it 
occurred. These tactics included obstructing relief supplies, distorting commercial 
food markets and preventing famine stricken populations from following 
traditional coping mechanisms (Efuk, 2000: 50). 
 
Stage two, which was from December 1986 to September 1988, witnessed a 
slow build up of the famine, concluding in the mass deaths by starvation of IDPs 
from Bahr-el-Ghazal during the middle of 1988. The two years of fighting 
between the belligerents and the resulting destruction of infrastructure, combined 
with by successive years of drought in the South as well as in the central and 
western parts of Sudan, generated the greatest single number of the world’s 
IDPs. This colossal displacement resulted from raiding by government militias, 
and the scorched-earth tactics of the regular army and the SPLM/A, which 
rendered much of northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and central Upper Nile a wasteland. 
The SPLM/A siege of government-held towns were tight and they denied access 
to relief agencies to deliver humanitarian assistance to populations within the 
besieged towns (Efuk, 2000: 50). 
 
Stage three, which was from October 1988 to September 1989, saw the situation 
improve in the rural areas following military gains by the SPLM/A, which 
prevented raiding by government militias. In the garrison towns, however, the 
famine intensified, as the SPLM/A noose became tighter (Efuk, 2000: 50). The 
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famine also came to the world’s attention at this point when the international 
community responded to a flood emergency in Khartoum (Bradbury et al. 2000). 
For the first time Western donors took decisive action at the cost of opposing the 
policies of government, and took the initiative to influence the course of events. 
The SPLM/A was also influenced by the donors to change its tactics and to 
accept food relief (Efuk, 2000: 51). 
 
Perez de Cuellar, then UN Sectary-General appointed James Grant, executive 
director of UNICEF, as his Special Envoy to Sudan. A conference took place in 
Khartoum and was attended by representatives from the UN, donor countries, 
relief INGOs, and the GoS (Akol, 2005).  The international humanitarian 
response was accompanied by diplomatic pressure on the government and the 
SPLM/A to end the war. The timing proved politically expedient (Robinson, 2002: 
50). In early 1989, the military situation was such that each side needed a 
reprieve: the government to recover from losses and the SPLM/A to consolidate 
gains. Politically the time was propitious as the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi 
was weak and under pressure to end the war; the SPLM/A needed time to 
establish their authority in areas newly under their control and both sided wanted 
to reinstate themselves in the good graces of the international community 
(Rhodes, 2002: 9). By participating in OLS, the SPLM/A could obtain a degree of 
legitimacy and export their causes to the international community.  
  
Grant shuttled between Khartoum and the South and after a number of bilateral 
meetings, managed to gain an unprecedented agreement: the UN were allowed 
to provide humanitarian assistance to both government and rebel-controlled 
areas with the consent of the GoS and SPLM/A. This enabled humanitarian 
agencies to deliver assistance to all conflict-affected populations without military 
assistance or a Chapter VII resolution (Levine, 1997). Grant succeeded in 
convincing the parties to the conflict to agree to a six-month ceasefire in order to 
stock food on site for the needy population (Akol, 2005). While never dependent 
on there being a ceasefire, the creation of OLS was closely linked to efforts to 
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resolve the war. However, a military coup on the 30th of June 1989 pre-empted a 
peace settlement. The coup, which brought Omar el Bashir and the National 
Islamic Front (NIF) to power, took place four days before Sadiq el Mahdi was to 
meet Garang in Addis Ababa, and signalled that the war was set to continue. In 
October 1989, the civil war duly resumed (Bradbury et al. 2000: 16).  
 
3.4.   Operation Lifeline Sudan 
OLS represented a major international endeavour to deal with the withering 
ordeal of human suffering in Sudan. It was the longest running humanitarian 
relief programme of its kind. With the famine of 1984 – 1986 in the North largely 
controlled, the scene shifted to the South (Deng and Minear, 1992: 83). OLS had 
national, regional and global significance. Created in 1989, it was the first 
humanitarian programme that sought to assist internally displaced and war-
affected civilians during an ongoing conflict within a sovereign country, as 
opposed to refugees beyond its borders (Bradbury, Benini, Duffield, Hendrie; 
Jaspars, Johnson, Karim, Larbi and Macrae, 1996). OLS was one of history’s 
largest humanitarian interventions in an active civil war as well as establishing a 
precedent for many humanitarian interventions that followed, for example in 
Angola, Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia (Rhodes, 2002: 3).   
 
While having operational similarities, OLS was nevertheless distinct from many 
other integrated interventions. Firstly, OLS was not dependent on military 
protection of humanitarian aid and displaced civilians. Rather, access was largely 
reliant on the application of international pressure on the warring parties. 
Secondly, the ultimate sovereignty of the GoS was not challenged. There was an 
equivocal and temporary ceding of sovereignty to UNICEF in parts of the South 
that were outside of GoS control. Thus, OLS could be regarded as an informal or 
negotiated safe area programme (Karim et al., 1996: 2).  
 
The underlying motives for choosing the OLS approach could be found in the 
changing nature of global politics. The end of the Cold War represented the 
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withdrawal of diplomacy and support from the peripheral South by Northern 
states. OLS was a product of the tendency of donor states to use humanitarian 
agencies as extension of their foreign policy. They appeared to be good 
international citizens by donating funds to OLS, while not getting directly involved 
in the conflict; and by influencing the actions of INGOs, donor states were able to 
protect and advance their interests. For example, the US influenced the actions 
of INGOs through donations by USAID to ensure that their oil interests in 
Southern Sudan were protected. 
 
The complex nature of the civil war and the war-induced famine necessitated an 
integrated approach. The multitude of belligerents involved in the conflict and the 
collapse of GoS sovereignty in the South forced the UN to negotiate and sign 
agreements with the armed opposition movements. The collapse of GoS 
sovereignty in the South obliged UNICEF to adopt a quasi-governmental persona 
in the Southern sector. The sheer magnitude of the emergency necessitated the 
inclusion of a variety of humanitarian agencies. The more humanitarian agencies 
active in an emergency, the more important coordination and regulation 
becomes, which explains the implementation of the OLS consortium. OLS 
reflected the growing tendency of subcontracting public functions to private 
organisations. By the 1990s, INGOs received more funding from donors than UN 
agencies, which demanded their inclusion and greater coordination and 
regulation.  
 
The desire to assist civilians within an ongoing war reflected an expansion of the 
definition of human security, whereby the international community had an 
obligation to safeguard individual rights where individual states failed to do so. 
GoS failed to assure the human rights and well being of the civilian population of 
Sudan, which necessitated international intervention. Furthermore, the concept of 
security in Sudan encompassed human rights, access to basic foodstuffs, 
economic welfare and development. 
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OLS was a consortium of UN and INGOs working with the people of Sudan, 
whose survival and protection was jeopardised by the CPE and 
underdevelopment. According to OLS mission statement, in striving to meet the 
needs of the Southern Sudanese, OLS “saves lives, promotes self-reliance, 
protects people’s safety and dignity and enables them to invest in their future” 
(UN, 2003).  
 
OLS succeeded in affirming certain humanitarian principles for providing 
assistance in conflict situations. OLS was guided by the principles of the ICRC 
Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief, which were: 1.) the humanitarian imperative 
comes first; 2.) aid should be neutral and impartial and aid priorities should be 
based on need alone, (Aboum et al. 1990: 3.) aid will not be used to further a 
particular political or religious standpoint; 4.) relief agencies will endeavour not to 
act as instruments of government foreign policy; 5.) international relief agencies 
will respect culture and custom; 6.) disaster response should be built on local 
capacities; 7.) ways should be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the 
management of relief aid; 8.) relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities 
to disaster as well as meeting basic needs; and 9.) relief agencies need to be 
accountable to both beneficiaries and donors (UN, 2003). Despite these 
principles being accepted by humanitarian agencies, the situation on the ground 
made it difficult to implement these principles. 
 
Furthermore, the following terms formed the basis of OLS: 1.) the UN had to deal 
with all the parties to the conflict that control territory through which relief items 
would pass or to which they would be delivered; 2.) the parties to the conflict 
committed themselves to the safe and unhindered passage and delivery of relief 
items to the needy population; and 3.) the UN, as a neutral body, was to 
coordinate the operations with the parties to the conflict (Akol, 2005). 
 
Operating under the auspices of OLS offered INGOs various advantages. 
Although some INGOs worked outside OLS, for example Norwegian Aid, the 
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advantages accrued from being inside was such that most choose to work within 
the consortium. In 1998, there were some 10 agencies working outside, 
compared with 40 within (Bradbury et al. 2000: 46). OLS managed to improve 
funding options for INGOs previously working in the area by providing public 
awareness through its international presence (Rhodes, 2002: 4). Membership 
provided access to logistical and communications support, the protection of the 
OLS security system and information. UNICEF undertook to negotiate access to 
project sites and to assist in mediating any disputes with counterparts. For those 
INGOs operating in the GoS areas, OLS provided the only legal means to work 
cross-border in the Southern sector (Bradbury et al. 2000: 46; UN, 1990). In the 
Southern sector, the Agreement on Ground Rules institutionalised the 
relationship between the opposition movements and INGOs, which enabled 
INGOs to operate in the South and to obtain a degree of protection for relief 
workers (SPLM and UN/OLS, 1995). 
 
However, some INGOs have criticised the logistical support managed by the UN. 
According to MSF, “the flight capacity of OLS was not able to respond to the 
huge needs presented…[t]his was largely due to logistical as well as 
management problems” (Duffield et al. 2000). Resentment about centralised 
decision-making and the lack of an INGO perspective led to calls for greater 
deregulation and decentralisation (Bradbury et al. 2000: 46). Despite the fact that 
INGOs had had a presence in Sudan even before the implementation of OLS, 
during the 1990s, INGOs were not an integral part of the assessment process for 
future plans of action. Failing to include INGOs in the OLS programme planning 
not only resulted in a loss of potential expertise, but also led to ineffective 
coordination (Rhodes, 2002: 16). The differing contractual and operational 
environments in the Northern and Southern sectors further undermined 
coordination efforts. In the Northern sector, INGOs were little more than 
government extensions. Thus, INGOs preferred to work in the Southern sector, 
where they had greater control over relief resources and the implementation of 
relief and development programmes. Within the context of large relief operations, 
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effective coordination is crucial. OLS failed to coordinate effectively the 
humanitarian programmes of agencies operating under its mandate. For 
example, in Southern Sudan alone, there were five monitoring systems that were 
managed by the FAO, WFP, SCF, USAID, INGOs and the Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). This wealth of information was ineffective, 
because there was a lack of a unified system for data monitoring between the 
various agencies. Throughout its history, OLS remained a loose amalgamation of 
INGOs with different criteria and interests that, based on a competitive funding 
system, resulted in an ad hoc operation without any leadership or even a 
consolidated information system (Rhodes, 2002: 14).  
 
OLS arose out of the failure of the international community to prevent the 1988 
war-induced famine in Bahr-el-Ghazal. As an organisational structure and system 
of management, the evolution of OLS can be divided into two stages. The initial 
phase spanned the period from 1989 to 1992, while the second stage ran from 
1992 to 2004. This division reflects the two main periods of OLS relief activity 
(Karim et al. 1996: 15).  
 
The first phase covered the implementation of the Plans of Action for OLS I (April 
to August 1989) and OLS II (March to December 1990). These plans, which 
proposed to deliver relief across the lines of conflict along designated “corridors 
of tranquillity”, assumed that the emergency would be short lived and that the 
interventions would be temporary. Interestingly, the agreements establishing 
OLS were unsigned, informal agreements (Bradbury et al. 2000: 30). 
 
The initial phase established the basic division between the Northern and 
Southern sectors, agreements between the warring parties were ad hoc and 
informal as the first signed OLS agreement was not reached until 1994 (Karim et 
al. 1996: 15). In the government-held areas, the so-called Northern sector, the 
structures of relief operations reflected traditional coordination mechanisms, 
whereby the UNDP provided a light framework, liaising with government and 
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collating information (Levine, 1997: 7). Overall coordination was provided by a 
UN Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations based in Khartoum (Bradbury 
et al. 2000: 30). In the Southern sector, OLS provided an integrated logistics and 
security framework within which UNICEF, WFP and INGOs implemented their 
programmes (Levine, 1997: 7). UNICEF coordinated cross-border operations run 
from Nairobi, Kenya, working along-side WFP and international and Sudanese 
NGOs (SNGOs) (Bradbury et al. 2000: 30).  
 
This early period also established the regulatory framework, whereby INGOs 
working in rebel-held areas had to sign Letters of Understanding (LoU) with 
UNICEF/OLS, under which they agreed to abide by the principles of OLS for 
logistical and security support from the UN (Bradbury et al. 2000: 30). 
Furthermore, INGOs were expected to submit copies of project proposals 
developed for their donors including a budget summary to UNICEF/OLS (UN, 
1997). 
 
During the first two years, OLS was largely conceived in terms of the discreet 
and time limited operations of OLS I and II. During its first six months, OLS 
succeeded in moving relief supplies across the lines of the conflict (Bradbury et 
al. 2000: 30). However, the initial phase of OLS was characterised by renewed 
fighting and deepening crisis of consent (UN, 1991a). OLS Southern sector 
activities began to decline and take on an ad hoc appearance, a process 
exacerbated by the failed proximity talks in October 1991 (Karim et al. 1996: 15).  
 
The growing crisis of OLS was the product of various aspects. While the NIF 
government at first supported OLS, their attitude became increasingly critical as 
fighting resumed late in 1989. The GoS was of the opinion that OLS was 
benefiting the SPLM/A, whereas the SPLM/A believed the relief operation was 
biased in favour of the GoS. By 1992, OLS activities were more or less in 
abeyance; it was claimed that less than 10% of the potentially reachable 
population was accessed. Through GoS and SPLM/A restrictions, the whole of 
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Bahr-el-Ghazal and Jonglei were effectively closed to aid agencies (Karim et al. 
1996: 16). 
 
The perception of the GoS and SPLM/A concerning OLS contributed to a change 
starting from 1992 in the nature of this programme in the direction of increased 
formalisation and the incorporation of a relief-to-development approach in the 
OLS mandate (Ntata, 1999: 9). The formalisation of OLS was represented in 
OLS becoming a continuous operation with administrative arrangements to suit. 
The newly formed Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), which replaced the 
UNDP in Sudan, was given overall responsibility for coordination and was tasked 
with reenergising OLS. The DHA obtained an agreement from the GoS to open 
up access and the reinvigorated humanitarian programme was supported by 
external political pressure (Bradbury et al. 2000: 31). 
 
Since 1992, there was an increased tendency to see UN coordination as 
confined to South Sudan only. In the North, the government was defined as the 
main regulatory body for humanitarian operations (Karim et al. 1996: 16). Not 
only had this confirmed the earlier separation between the Northern and 
Southern sectors, it encouraged the administration of relief in each area to take 
on a different institutional dynamic. In GoS areas, a process of organisational 
consolidation and deepening was implemented in 1992. In the Southern sector, 
UNICEF’s development of Ground Rules in relation to the opposition movements 
has stimulated the attempt to broaden civil structures and relations (Karim et al. 
1996: 16). Compared with the previous phase, in the Southern Sectors there had 
been marked programme expansion, whereas programme expansion in the 
Northern Sector had discontinued. 
 
The humanitarian principles that govern negotiated access have undergone 
significant changes. From 1992, was a tendency to interpret access as relating to 
specific war-affected areas only. In other words, there had been a definitional 
shift in OLS from principle to geography (Karim et al. 1996: 22). The UN 
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conceded to the GoS new power to differentiate between “war zones” and areas 
“affected by war” within the Southern sector. Henceforth, the UN and INGOs only 
had access to areas “affected by war” in the South. This enabled the GoS to 
designate some areas of South Sudan as “war zones”, and thereby excluded an 
OLS presence (Karim et al. 1996: 28).  
 
OLS experienced a significant change from 1994. From April 1989, through the 
end of 1993, the international community focused largely on saving lives by 
providing emergency relief. Some INGOs had embarked on limited development 
programmes even before the implementation of OLS, but these programmes 
were of too small a scale to have a noteworthy impact. However, the attention of 
OLS began to shift towards rehabilitation and reconstruction in 1994. In support 
of this relief-to-development policy, donors and INGOs pointed to the fact that the 
Sudan situation was unique for three reasons. Firstly, in Sudan OLS was 
established with the consent of the warring parties. Secondly, both the GoS and 
the opposition movements demanded that OLS should move away from its 
strictly relief aid mandate to more long-term programmes, such as capacity 
building, rehabilitation and development. Thirdly, the UN report gave an explicit 
directive to relief agencies that emergency assistance should be provided in 
ways that would support recovery and long-term development in the Sudan 
(Efuk, 2000: 52). Thus, OLS’ mandate shifted from that of an emergency relief 
programme to that of a relief-to-development programme. 
 
3.5.   Differing Contractual and Operational Environment within OLS 
The operational separation between the Northern and Southern Sectors of OLS 
engendered two distinct aid cultures; and the effects of aid in each area were 
indeed markedly different (Duffield, Jok, Keen, Loane, O’Reilly, Ryle and Winter, 
2000: 8). The main reason for this operational separation was the unwillingness 
of the UN to challenge the sovereignty of the GoS in the North. By allowing the 
GoS to retain some of its sovereignty, the UN managed to gain access to war-
affected population in the South (UN, 2003).  
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A mandated, UN umbrella for humanitarian operations in South Sudan was a 
major innovation. However, in the Northern Sector, a more conventional 
arrangement was adopted which reflected the status quo (Karim et al. 1996: 30). 
Due to a lack of government presence in the South, UNICEF had greater control 
over the operational implementation of OLS in the South. However, the GoS 
exerted significant control over the implementation of OLS in the North. Some 
observers have noted that the implementation of the relief-to-development 
continuum and the control of the GoS over OLS in the North enabled the 
government to mould the development programme to suit its own objectives. 
Unequal development between the Northern and Southern Sectors of the Sudan 
was one of the root causes of the civil war. Thus, the GoS strategy may have 
been devastating to the peace-building process in the long-run (Duffield et al. 
2000: 20). 
 
The ability of the GoS to deny access by imposing flight ban on areas in need of 
humanitarian relief was a major weakness of OLS. Using its sovereign position, 
the GoS was able to restrict access not only in the North, but in the South as 
well, through flight restrictions and stricter demands prior clearance of all 
movements (Karim et al. 1996: 56). This allowed the GoS to exert a level of 
control over the distribution of international humanitarian relief, which in a highly 
politicised environment may have had dire consequences. The opposition 
movements also denied humanitarian relief agencies access, albeit in a smaller 
scale and this tactic diminished since the signing of the Ground Rules (Vinci, 
2006: 14). 
 
In the Southern sector, INGOs had greater flexibility in implementing their relief 
or development programmes and they had greater control over their own 
resources. However, the SPLM/A requested that INGOs work in conjunction with 
the relief wing of their organisation, the SRRA, and help build-up the capacity of 
Sudanese NGOs (Fenton and Sowinska: 2005). Furthermore, the responsibility 
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to regulate and monitor the actions of INGOs in the South resided with the UN, 
not with the GoS, which explains their greater flexibility in the South. 
 
In the North, INGOs were mere extensions of the GoS’ policies and aspirations. 
The GoS established a very restrictive regulatory environment. In contractual 
terms, INGOs were little more than extensions of the state in Northern Sudan, 
and were bound by a code of conduct, the Country Agreement, which defined 
humanitarian aid as a purely technical response blind to context or cause. This 
called into question the role of INGOs in the North (Karim et al. 1996: 60). This 
neutral stance on relief stood in stark contrast with the approach to relief in the 
South. The Ground Rules established, in principle, a link between human rights 
and humanitarianism. It could be argued that INGOs in the North were neither 
accountable to donors nor beneficiaries; they were only accountable to the GoS, 
because they were dependent on the GoS to gain access. 
 
The extent and quality of access in the South was much greater than in the 
North, and a broader range of programmes were able to develop. It seems that 
INGOs had greater flexibility over the development and implementation of their 
relief programmes and greater control over their resources in areas where state 
sovereignty was either weak or collapsed. The distinction between relief 
operations in the Northern and Southern sectors exacerbated the developmental 
inequalities between these two areas. However, it seems that in the Southern 
Sector, where INGOs had greater leeway over their programmes, more 
development projects were implemented than in the Northern sector, where the 
distribution of relief and development programmes were under tight government 
control.   
 
3.6.   Conclusion 
The complex nature of the emergency in Sudan was as a result of a multitude of 
root causes. This complexity has made the international response to the crisis 
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problematic as the root causes were not fully understood within context of the 
country.  
 
Sudan is an excellent example of a CPE. The emergency in Sudan was a 
multidimensional crisis with profound human suffering; the root causes of the 
conflict were many and complex; the war-induced famine aggravated the 
situation; and the GoS no longer had sovereign control over Southern Sudan. 
The tactics employed by the GoS and the opposition movements destroyed 
civilian livelihoods and traditional coping mechanisms. Thus, the effects of the 
drought were experienced more severely as a result of these tactics, which 
created a war-induced famine.   
 
The international community responded to the emergency in Sudan by 
implementing OLS, which at the time was an innovative and unique operation 
that set a precedent for future integrative responses to CPEs. However, OLS was 
distinct form other post-Cold War humanitarian interventions as OLS neither 
depended on military protection of civilians and relief aid nor called into effect 
Chapter VII. 
 
The inability of the international community to understand the complex nature of 
the situation in Sudan was reflected in the initial phase, when OLS was 
mandated to be a short-term relief operation. The intractability of the civil war and 
the resurfacing of war-induced famines illustrated that a more formal and robust 
approach was necessary. The second phase of OLS attempted to address these 
weaknesses by becoming more institutionalised. The second phase also saw the 
OLS mandate shift from a purely emergency relief programme to a programme 
that incorporates development, rehabilitation and capacity-building.   
 
Whereas OLS evolved in response to the changing circumstance within Sudan, it 
also reflected the developments which took within the international humanitarian 
system: the shift from only delivering emergency relief to the implementation of a 
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relief-to-development approach; the expansion of the concept of human security 
whereby capacity-building and development is seen as a means through which 
individuals can improve their lives; the growth of subcontracting public functions 
to private organisations; and the inclusion of human rights in humanitarianism. 
 
There appeared to be a significant contradiction within the structure of OLS in the 
Southern sector. According to the Ground Rules Agreement, the guiding 
principles of OLS were “the provision of aid according to need, neutrality, 
impartiality”. Thus, OLS adhered to the traditional humanitarian principles. 
However, the Ground Rules Agreement was linked human rights to 
humanitarianism. Furthermore, as of 1994, the GoS and the SPLM/A requested 
that OLS should adopt a relief-to-development continuum. As explained in 
chapter II, the marriage of human rights and development with humanitarianism 
makes the applicability of traditional humanitarian principles impossible. Whether 
INGOs delivering aid in the Sudan were able to foster development and promote 
human rights while adhering to traditional humanitarian principles will be 
evaluated. 
 
OLS offered various advantages to INGOs operating under the UNICEF-umbrella 
organisation. INGOs were important actors within OLS as they received more 
funding from donors than UN agencies. The next chapter will investigate whether 
INGOs were effective in delivering relief to war affected civilians in Sudan and 
whether they were able to implement the relief-to-development continuum 
through the implementation of rehabilitation and capacity-building initiatives. 
 
The main factors, which drove this change in the international humanitarian 
regime, were the changing nature of state sovereignty; the changing nature of 
warfare and CPEs; the expansion of the concept of security to include human 
security; and the withdrawal of diplomacy from the periphery by Western 
governments. These developments enabled a multitude of humanitarian actors to 
gain access to the war-affected population within a sovereign state. Furthermore, 
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traditional humanitarianism appeared to be ineffective in addressing the multitude 
of problems, which humanitarian agencies had to face when delivering relief 
within the context of CPEs. Thus, neo-humanitarianism, which focuses on human 
rights and development, became the dominant approach to humanitarian 
programming in Sudan.  
 
Since 1994, humanitarian agencies, including INGOs, operating under the OLS 
mandate adopted the relief-to-development approach to humanitarian 
assistance. The rationale behind this approach was that it would prevent 
dependency on external relief; and self-sufficiency and development will 
contribute to the peace-building process. 
 
The criticisms INGOs received during the 1990s encouraged them to adopt a “do 
no harm” approach, which should have theoretically prevented them from fuelling 
conflict within the context of a CPE. INGOs adopted this approach in Sudan in 
order to protect human rights and prevent relief being diverted to achieve military 
and economic aims. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
IMPLEMENTING INGO HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMMES IN SUDAN  
 
4.1. Introduction 
INGOs have had decades of humanitarian experience in Sudan as most 
commenced their humanitarian programmes in the 1980s. Initially these 
programmes were traditional humanitarian operations, which focused on the 
delivery of emergency relief and adhered to the ICRC humanitarian principles. 
However, the OLS mandate adopted the relief-to-development continuum in 
1994, and INGOs followed suit and started running developmental programmes. 
 
The sampled INGOs, namely, Oxfam, CARE, World Vision and SCF adopted the 
relief-to-development continuum in Sudan. MSF’s programmes did not focus on 
development. However, its programmes unintentionally contributed to the 
development of the health sector. Furthermore, these INGOs delivered 
emergency aid to those in need; adhered to the “do no harm” approach; and 
attempted to protect human rights. Thus, INGOs in the Sudan experienced a shift 
in humanitarian programming from one that adhered to traditional humanitarian 
principles to one that adopted the neo-humanitarian approach of rights-based 
developmental humanitarianism. 
 
By evaluating the impact of the relief-to-development continuum; the delivery of 
emergency relief; targeting methods used; and the protection of human rights, 
the effectiveness of INGOs operating under the OLS mandate will be evaluated. 
Furthermore, common problems associated with INGOs, for instance, 
accountability; institutional amnesia and lack of local knowledge; monitoring and 
evaluation; and transparency will be evaluated within the context of OLS. 
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4.2. Sample of INGOs Operating in Sudan 
The first INGOs to work in Sudan started their operations in the South after the 
end of the first civil war in 1972. By the end of the 1970s, only a few INGOs had 
made their appearance in the North. However, the war-induced famine of the 
1980s boosted the number of INGOs operating in the North. INGOs assumed a 
prominent welfare role and donors increasingly funded INGOs and UN agencies 
in preference to bilateral aid to the GoS. During the same period, the spread of 
the second civil war in the South caused many INGOs there to leave Sudan, 
while others fell back to a few government-held towns. Over the most of the 
South, INGO activity during the latter half of the 1980s was absent. With the 
implementation of OLS in 1989, INGOs regained entry into Southern Sudan, 
resulting in the proliferation of INGO activity in this area. Thus, INGOs had at 
least a 19-year history as significant actors in the GoS-controlled areas of 
Northern Sudan, and they had a 24-year involvement in Southern areas if one 
takes into account the war-induced gap in the 1980s. This engagement went 
through a number of phases and involved many programme initiatives (Duffield 
et al. 2000: 79). The most significant change concerning INGO humanitarian 
policy in Sudan, and the focus of this paper, was the implementation of the relief-
to-development continuum. 
 
4.2.1. Oxfam 
Oxfam carried out several emergency programmes in both the Southern and 
Northern sectors of Sudan since 1983 (Oxfam, 2005; Ntata, 1999). These 
programmes included emergency water supply and hygiene promotion; 
emergency food and nutrition; livestock support programme; livestock epidemic 
control (Ntata, 1999: 15); and a relocation programme in Ed’Dien (Duffield et al. 
2000: 114).  
 
The emergency water supply and hygiene promotion involved the provision of 
clean water at 31 sites, mostly feeding centres and food distribution points. 
Oxfam’s emergency food and nutrition programme was carried out in Rumbek 
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and Agangrial towns. The livestock support programme aimed to support 
vulnerable livestock owners through the provision of additional medicines, 
vaccines, cold chain equipment, and veterinary equipment for increased disease 
treatment. The main objective of the livestock epidemic control programme in 
Bahrel Jebel in the Northern sector was to improve animal health for stronger 
livestock resources (Ntata, 1999: 15) 
 
Since the mid-1990s, Oxfam started working in a development fashion in the 
Ed’Dien area, namely Adu Matariq, El Goura and Adilla. The provision of donkey-
carts and goats on credit was a feature of such projects. Furthermore, Oxfam, in 
conjunction with SCF and International Rescue Committee (IRC), implemented 
an ambitious project aimed at 4 000 households, whereby Oxfam attempted to 
resettle 100 households in south Darfur (Duffield et al. 2000: 113). Oxfam 
focused their efforts on income generating activities through the promotion of 
activities such as tailoring, needlework, food services and sale of crafts (Efuk, 
2000: 59). In an attempt to develop the agricultural sector in the South, this INGO 
was involved in seeds and tools programmes (Efuk, 2000: 61). 
 
Throughout the OLS mandate, Oxfam focused on implementing and improving 
public health services, agricultural activity and care for livestock.  According to 
Oxfam’s website they “carr[y] out peace-building and conflict management work 
that aims to support and enhance traditional and existing structures of conflict 
resolution in order to maintain peace within villages…[Oxfam] addresses the 
causes of conflict by improving communities’ access to basic services and 
resources” (Oxfam, 2005). 
 
The rights-based approach adopted by Oxfam in Sudan was broadly one of 
empowerment, working with grassroots structures to raise people’s awareness of 
their entitlements, as well as developing better analysis of its work on local level 
conflict (Bradbury et al. 2000). 
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4.4.2.   Medicine Sans Frontiers  
MSF is a medical humanitarian organisation, thus there is a commitment to 
universal medical ethics, which are underpinned by demands of the duty to do 
good, “do no harm”, autonomy and justice. Although MSF holds to the core 
principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, these principles are not 
absolute and sacrosanct, but are critical guides (Tong, 2004: 180). MSF 
epitomizes the type of humanitarian agency, which does not shy away from 
accusing parties to a conflict of human rights abuses. Furthermore, MSF strongly 
adheres to the “do no harm” approach and are willing to withdraw their 
humanitarian support should they believe that their actions fuel the war. MSF 
rejects the usual operational rule of the ICRC to remain silent, and questions the 
doctrine of neutrality by suggesting that victims of war are not equal (Bradbury et 
al. 2000: 69). 
 
MSF set up two feeding centres in Wau, which had a population of 150 000 and 
supported the town’s hospital. It also ran therapeutic and supplementary feeding 
centres and supported primary health care centres in Panthou, Ajak, and 
Tieraliet, three villages of 5000-10 000 people controlled by the SPLM/A (Collins 
and Griekspoor, 2001: 740). MSF had six supplementary feeding centres in 
Bahr-el-Ghazal, catering for 12 000 children, and five therapeutic feeding 
centres. Supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes were implemented 
to address the issue of malnutrition of particular groups (Duffield et al. 2000: 
173). These feeding centres were established, because MSF realised that 
malnutrition would nullify the potential effects of their medical relief programmes 
(Collins and Griekspoor, 2001: 741).  
 
MSF’s approach to relief in the Sudan did not focus on relief-to-development 
continuum as most of this organisation’s focus was on the supply of medical 
relief goods and the establishment of supplementary and therapeutic feeding 
centres. However, MSF unintentionally contributed to the development of the 
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health sector by establishing the necessary infrastructure to deliver medical relief 
and by training local Sudanese health workers (Bower, 2000: 661).  
 
4.4.3.   Save the Children Foundation 
SCF’s mandate in Sudan adhered to the relief-to-development continuum, 
whereby emergency relief should foster development in order to make a positive 
and lasting change in the lives of disadvantaged women and children. This 
involved augmenting local capacities to enhance the coping mechanisms of IDPs 
and other war-affected populations as well as having a measurable impact 
(InterAction, 2000).  
 
SCF projects included the establishment of community kitchens; community 
survival kits; emergency relief items; nutritional activities through management of 
general food delivery; supplementary feeding of the malnourished; food security 
capacity enhancement through seeds/tools/goats procurement and distribution; 
support to water supply improvement through rehabilitation of existing water 
hand pumps; improvement of EIP coverage for children less than one, and 
pregnant women, through logistical support to immunization campaigns; 
resettlement of IDPs in South Darfur; basic education activities; and assistance 
to unaccompanied children in South Darfur (InterAction, 2000; Ntata, 1999: 17). 
 
In an attempt to implement the relief-to-development continuum, SCF distributed 
seeds and tools in order to enhance the agricultural sector. Based on 
consultations with local communities, a package of inputs adapted to regional 
needs was put together each year. The package aimed to produce a variety of 
crops that could be harvested at different times and thus diminish the risk of food 
insecurity. Mainly sorghum, groundnuts, sesame, maize and rice were 
distributed. Attempts by SCF to produce tools using local sources were 
problematic, thus locally produced samples of the tools required were replicated 
by manufactures in Kenya and then exported to Sudan. SCF implemented food-
for-seed exchanges, whereby double the amount of relief food was provided to 
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the supplier for every bag of seed that was presented to SCF's agricultural 
programme (O’Donnell, 2000). 
 
SCF’s rights-based approach focused mainly on the protection of children. In an 
interesting contrast to the approach of MSF, SCF argued that the strength of its 
programme lay in the quality of the relationships developed with local 
communities and authorities in areas where it operated. For this organisation, it 
was not just access per se that was important, but the quality of access 
(Bradbury et al. 2000: 70). 
 
4.4.4. CARE 
CARE had been operating in Northern Sudan since 1979 and in South Sudan 
since 1994. Initially this humanitarian agency’s activities commenced with 
emergency relief, but it progressed to include developmental and rehabilitation 
programmes, which focused on agricultural, environmental and primary health 
care activities (InterAction, 2000). 
 
CARE programmes in Northern Sudan focused on the development of the 
agricultural sector, natural resources management and food production. This 
programme attempted to address the short-term food security of vulnerable 
people through the provision of food-for-work activities. Furthermore, CARE 
developed an early warning system in order to create more effective emergency 
relief responses to communities in need. Similar to the health care programmes 
of Oxfam, CARE’s health programmes in the North focused on improving the 
health conditions of women, and children under the age of five (InterAction, 
2000). CARE relief effort concerning IDPs in Northern Sudan included improving 
access to water; and managing supplementary and therapeutic feeding to 
children under five, pregnant women and the elderly (CARE International, 2002). 
 
In the Southern sector, CARE’s programme aimed to reduce the cost of 
humanitarian relief and diminish food insecurity by promoting the internal 
 74
production and marketing by local farmers and build long-term capacity. These 
programmes also attempted to advance agricultural production through seed and 
tool distribution. The health care programme focused on the rehabilitation of 
health facilities, training and monitoring health workers, facilitation of essential 
drugs and medical supplies, integration of water resource development into 
preventative health education and improving the rural road network to improve 
access to health units (InterAction, 2000).  
 
4.2.5.   World Vision 
World Vision’s existence is based on the nucleus purpose of assisting the poor in 
the name of Christ. World Vision started operations in Sudan in 1983 and their 
major programmes were mainly focused in the South. In 2004, World Vision’s 
Sudan operations expanded into the North to begin addressing the needs 
created by the Darfur conflict (World Vision, 2009). 
 
Initially World Vision’s programmes were confined to delivering emergency relief 
to populations in need. However, since the mid-1990s its humanitarian relief 
programmes adopted a developmental characteristic (World Vision, 2009). World 
Vision’s objective in Sudan was to advance and build self-reliance for southern 
Sudanese. Its programmes included agriculture and food production, emergency 
relief, primary health care, water and sanitation, local capacity for peace, and 
local grain purchase and enterprise development, which include soap making, oil 
presses and grinding mills, tailoring, and bicycle repair shops (Interaction, 2000; 
World Vision, 2009). 
 
Similar to the other INGOs discussed, World Vision attempted to improve the 
agricultural sector through the distribution of seeds and tools. Furthermore, it 
engaged in the transfer of appropriate agricultural technologies through farmer 
field days and demonstration plots. Emergency relief programmes included 
general food distributions; therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes; 
and family survival kits such as cooking utensils, fishing line, and plastic 
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sheeting. World Vision’s primary health care initiatives involved the establishment 
of 14 health clinics; immunisation of children and women; construction and 
support of rural clinics that provide essential curative and preventative services; 
training health staff and traditional birth attendants; nutrition monitoring; and 
prevention and case management of guinea worm. Water and sanitation 
programmes were spread throughout Tonj, Gogrial and Yambio and included the 
construction of hand-dug and hand-drilled wells, pit-latrines, and rehabilitation of 
existing boreholes. From February 1998, World Vision embarked on a local 
capacity for peace initiative to ensure that its projects “do no harm” to the people 
it was serving in Southern Sudan (Interaction, 2000). 
 
4.3. Implementing INGO Humanitarian Programmes 
The implementation of INGO programmes refers to the execution of the neo-
humanitarian approach; namely, the operation of the relief-to-development 
continuum; delivering emergency aid; targeting methods used; the “do no harm” 
approach; and the protection of human rights. 
 
4.3.1. The Relief-to-Development Continuum 
The sampled INGOs, to a lesser extent MSF, incorporated the relief-to-
development continuum within their humanitarian programmes in Sudan. In order 
to move legitimately from relief aid programmes to development aid programmes, 
three elementary conditions must be in place: a minimum level of security, 
respect for human rights and humanitarian access; empirical evidence from the 
field needs to demonstrate that the emergency is over; and moving from relief to 
development aid is contingent on donor governments accepting the legitimacy of 
national governmental structures and of the rebel movements. From 1994-2004 
none of these conditions were present in Sudan. Sudan was described as 
suffering form a chronic CPE during this period, and in such a context, the 
uncritical pursuit of developmental strategies may have a negative effect on the 
welfare of conflict-affected populations (Bradbury, Duffield, Jaspars; Johnson and 
Macrea, 1997: 223).  
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CPEs are not short-term, nor can livelihoods be structurally secure in such 
situations (Jaspars and Shoham, 1999: 361). The violent and protracted nature 
of Sudan’s civil war resulted in the widespread destruction of livelihoods and 
continuous insecurity. Within this context, it was impossible for relief to link to 
anything that could foster development because the local economy was 
destroyed, there was a lack of access to agricultural land, and a lack of access to 
employment and regular income. 
 
The main method of linking relief to development was the reduction of food aid 
justified on reducing a dependency for which evidence was not advanced. This 
approach did not succeeded in creating self-sufficiency although it led to 
significant additional suffering (Duffield et al. 2000: 98). At programme level, 
there was a notable deficiency in innovation and diversity in strategies designed 
to achieve development. The primary strategy in Sudan to move from relief to 
development was the reduction in general rations for war-affected populations 
(Bradbury et al. 1997). Given the absence of any evidence of dependency and 
the lack of any comprehensive development tools that relief activities could link 
to, it was foolhardy to cut relief in the hope of promoting self-sufficiency (Duffield 
et al. 2000: 95).  
 
The developmental programmes, such as income generating projects, pursued 
by INGOs were hampered by the conflict-induced emergency in Sudan, and a 
lack of local knowledge on the part of INGOs. Oxfam and World Vision focused 
their efforts on income generating through promotion of activities such as 
tailoring, needlework, food service and sales of craft. However, these projects did 
little to create self-sufficiency due to the collapse of the local economy and the 
fact that the second-hand industries virtually killed the textiles and dress making 
business (Efuk, 2000: 59). The inability of Oxfam, SCF, CARE and World Vision 
to evaluate and monitor the effects of implementing their water facilities 
negatively influenced the peace-building process. When INGOs installed or 
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improved water facilities, the displaced had to pay tax to predatory neighbours to 
use these facilities (Duffield et al. 2000: 37). This undermined and weakened 
inter-group connections.  
 
Oxfam, World Vision, SCF and CARE distributed seeds and tools in an attempt 
to rebuild the agricultural sector and foster food security (O’Donnell, 2000; Efuk, 
2000; InterAction; 2000). The experiences of INGOs in Sudan illustrate that 
agricultural development is not applicable to CPEs. Firstly, an increase in 
development aid for the agricultural sector resulted in a decrease in emergency 
food aid. During times of extreme food shortages in Sudan, beneficiaries resorted 
to eating the seeds delivered by INGOs instead of planting them. Clearly, this 
illustrates that an increase in development relief does not justify a decrease in 
emergency relief. Secondly, insecurity encouraged population movements, thus 
civilians did not stay in one area long enough to develop the agricultural sector. 
Thirdly, throughout the history of Sudan’s civil war, belligerents deliberately 
targeted civilians with livelihoods. Therefore, the development of the agricultural 
sector increased the insecurity of civilians (Ntata, 1999: 26). Finally, a major 
problem was the timing of distribution, and the type of seeds and tools delivered 
by INGOs. Seeds, which had to be imported form Kenya, usually arrived late in 
the planting season and by the time they arrived the food deficit was so severe 
that civilians either consumed the seeds or lacked the strength to plant them 
(Duffield et al. 2000: 207). The quality of seeds delivered to Sudan was well 
below Kenyan standards (Bramel, Jones, Longley and Remington, 2002). SCF 
admitted that they were not able to implement the desired level of quality control 
on seeds or ensure that the seed had been stored in good conditions (O’Donnell, 
2000). Furthermore, the distribution of foreign varieties of seeds in the absence 
of prior consultation with communities frequently resulted in rejection. The INGOs 
imported Kenyan-tilling implements (jembes) which was not used to a significant 
extent in Sudan. Subsequently, after distribution, beneficiaries melted down the 
jembes and refashioned it to suit local tastes (Ntata, 1999: 31). Not only was the 
local context in Sudan not conducive to agricultural development, INGOs 
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displayed a disquieting lack of local knowledge by distributing the wrong type of 
seeds and agricultural tools.  
 
The development of the health care sector did not fare any better than the 
agricultural sector. Health care was completely inadequate in the South, as well 
as most of the North (Duffield et al. 2000). While INGOs were instrumental in 
rebuilding hospitals and establishing care centres for the displaced, Sudan had 
not achieved self-sufficiency in the health sector (MSF, 2004). This was evident 
from the consequences that followed the temporary withdrawal of World Vision in 
2000. The primary health-care service and mother-and-child units run by World 
Vision in Yamboi resulted in these centres closing with local staff unable to 
manage the facilities open even at a basic level (Bower, 2000: 661; WHO, 2000). 
The withdrawal of MSF from the Southern sector completely disabled the health 
sector in South Sudan (Maaroufi, 2000).  
 
Despite requests from the SLMP/A and SRRA for more support for education, 
INGOs did little in developing this sector. There was support for primary 
education since 1992, although was completely inadequate in relation to needs. 
In Bahr-el-Ghazal, only SCF was lending support to 88 schools, all of which lack 
basic educational materials, trained teachers and uniforms (InterAction, 2000; 
Duffield et al. 2000),  
 
The relief-to-development continuum was implemented in an attempt to curtail 
local dependency on foreign relief aid. However, the amount of aid delivered to 
the civilian population was never enough to foster dependency and according to 
two independent OLS reviews in 1996 and 2000, there was no significant 
evidence to suggest that relief fostered dependency in Sudan (Duffield et al. 
2000; Karim et al. 1996). The implementation of this continuum was not 
determined by realities in Sudan, but by a popular and fashionable theory within 
the international humanitarian regime that had been embraced by donors, UN 
agencies and INGOs. However, certain INGOs stated that the implementation of 
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the continuum was promoted because it conformed to the priorities of the GoS, 
and, in part, because of donor imperatives. Some felt that their programmes in 
Sudan should have remained limited to improving the delivery of emergency 
humanitarian assistance and that development was inappropriate in an unstable 
environment.     
 
4.3.2.   Delivering Emergency Aid 
Compared to the development activities, INGOs were more effective in delivering 
emergency aid to the civilian population. In mitigating the effects of extreme 
poverty and hunger, food aid helped 3, 4 million vulnerable people in 2003, and a 
further 2, 5 million since the start of 2004 (Kapila, 2004). The presence of INGOs 
was instrumental in saving lives during periods of acute starvation and diseases.  
 
Although OLS food aid inputs remained small, they assisted in keeping 
household labour forces intact, reduced the amount of time spent on alternative 
food sources, and, most importantly, reinforced networks of kinship and 
exchange between nearby communities. Food inputs received in Mapel in 1998, 
for instance, helped to increase labour available to households for cultivation by 
reducing the need to go out in search of food through fishing, collecting wild 
foods, and labour migration (Rhodes, 2002: 4). 
 
Despite Sudan not achieving self-sufficiency in the health sector, INGOs played a 
crucial role in offering civilians access to basic and emergency health care. 
However, INGO activities within this field were hampered by a lack of resources 
resulting in the quality of health being good, but the coverage being poor (MSF, 
2004).  
 
According to the World Health Organisation, during OLS more than 75% of 
illness and death in Sudan were related to infectious diseases. The ability of 
INGOs to be flexible and respond quickly to outbreaks of infectious diseases was 
augmented by EWARN (a life-saving outbreak early warning system), which 
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vastly improved INGO responses to outbreak alerts. In 1999, the Rumbek pilot 
site, run by Oxfam, was able to control relapsing fever with only three deaths and 
140 cases compared to 26 00 deaths in the September 1998 to March 1999 
epidemic. In Equatoria, CARE was responsible for managing and investigating 
the lingering malaria epidemic in the area; lab confirmation and management 
advice could be obtained within three days, which decreased the mortality rate 
(WHO, 2000). MSF supported primary health structures, often offering the only 
medical services available for entire regions. For example in Akuen, the MSF-
supported hospital was the only available health facility in the region, where 47, 
542 consultations were realised and 2, 527 people were hospitalised in 2002 
(MSF, 2003). 
 
Despite the successes of INGOs in delivering emergency relief, their efforts were 
severely constrained by the relief-to-development continuum; a lack of 
continuous financial resources; OLS’ management and logistical problems; and 
ineffective targeting, which will be discussed in the next section (Karim et al. 
1997). These constrictions led to missed opportunities whereby relief could have 
reduced dependency in the sense that it could have enabled households to 
conserve their assets and remain in their home areas, thereby supporting 
agricultural and livestock programmes. Furthermore, emergency aid could have 
reduced conflict in that an infusion of resources into a reasonably secure, yet 
resource-poor, area may have decreased the likelihood of a criminal or violent 
misappropriation of food and other supplies (Duffield et al. 2000: 44).  
 
4.3.3.   Targeting the Vulnerable 
A common limitation that most relief operations face is a lack of a reliable source 
of continual funding. Protracted emergencies are often accompanied by a decline 
in resources over time. This leads to pressure to target, even when this may not 
be justified (Jaspars and Shohan, 1999: 359-360). Targeting means ensuring 
that the required assistance gets to the people who need it, at the time it is 
needed, in the quantity it is needed and for the period it is needed (Burns and 
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Maxwell, 2008: 14). Despite the fact that OLS was a large and financially 
expensive relief operation, one must take into account relativity: Sudan is a large 
country and the majority of areas within this country were in need of humanitarian 
aid. For example, during the 1998 Bahr-el Ghazal famine the number of 
operations implemented within this area in comparison to the overall size of the 
province, it is possible to deduce that OLS could only have covered 18-23% of 
the province at one given period in time (Rhodes, 2002: 9). This forced INGOs 
and other humanitarian agencies to target the most vulnerable households within 
the country.  
 
The main objective of targeting in Sudan was to minimise exclusion (Burns and 
Maxwell, 2008: 5). In terms of emergency humanitarian relief, the main reasons 
for targeting are limited resources and the desire to focus on the worst affected 
areas and populations. In terms of the relief-to-development continuum, targeting 
has been justified on the notion that aid should not destroy the local economy. In 
applying the relief-to-development continuum model, the rationale of minimising 
damage to the local economy has been expanded into reducing dependency of 
emergency affected populations and supporting local coping strategies. 
Targeting requires an analysis of vulnerability; namely, a study and identification 
of the population most severely affected by the crisis. The concept of vulnerability 
is not straightforward and the identified target groups cannot necessarily be 
selected as the most vulnerable in all situations. Identifying the vulnerable 
necessitates an analysis of the type of risks that people face and the means they 
have to cope with them (Jaspars and Shoham, 1999: 360-364).   
 
By evaluating targeting in CPEs, it is possible to determine the effectiveness of 
INGOs programmes in delivering emergency humanitarian relief and fostering 
development. Despite the fact that targeting was not justifiable within the context 
of the Sudan, the lack of continual and timely financial resources compelled 
INGOs to implement targeting. However, by assessing the quality of their 
targeting programmes, and the type of aid that was delivered, it is possible to 
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ascertain whether the vulnerable received emergency aid and whether 
development took root. 
 
During the OLS period, INGOs applied the Community Distribution System 
(Burns and Maxwell, 2008: 25). This approach, also known as community-based 
targeting, is any beneficiary selection carried out by its own members. In Sudan, 
villagers elected a relief committee (RC) at a public meeting. These committees 
usually consisted of 13 members (seven women and six men) to cover an area, 
usually representing all geographical units but not all villages or clans. The INGO 
discussed which geographical units were worst affected and determined the 
allocation of food by proportional piling. Chiefs were informed of the number of 
households to be targeted in the area and the RC was notified of the proportion 
of households, which was determined by the food-economy assessment. The 
entire population in the affected area was asked to come on the distribution day, 
where the RC identified female village representatives, called tieng wui (Rhodes, 
2002: 13), who selected the most vulnerable households to come and collect 
food (Jaspars and Shoham, 1999: 365). Thus, in Sudan distribution was done by 
local authorities, chiefs and the RC. 
 
While the Community Distribution System involved the participation of local 
communities, which is a characteristic embraced by neo-humanitarianism, this 
programme failed to assist the most vulnerable communities in Sudan. This 
failure can be attributed to INGOs’ inability to identify the most vulnerable groups. 
As food passed through local political structures, it was often diverted from the 
most vulnerable. It is important to understand the relationship between diversion 
and local political and economic processes and social norms (Duffield et al. 
2000: 184).  
 
Target groups in Sudan were defined as the physiologically vulnerable (the 
malnourished and sick, pregnant and lactating women, young children and the 
elderly), the socially vulnerable (female-headed households, unaccompanied 
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minors and the disabled) and the economically vulnerable (the poorest). 
However, in both the Northern and Southern sectors, local representatives 
favoured their own people in distributions. Rather than distribution based on 
need, resident populations were often given priority over the displaced. Thus, the 
most vulnerable were those populations that lacked local representation (Jaspars 
and Shoham, 1999: 362-365). In other words, the INGOs did not target the most 
vulnerable population groups. 
 
Few INGOs attempted to monitor or evaluate the impact of their targeting. The 
reasons for this were an acute lack of information and the inability of INGOs to 
exert control over relief items after being delivered. However, Oxfam and SCF 
addressed this issue. Oxfam chose to use project performance indicators and 
malnutrition levels as a monitoring tool combined with discussions with 
communities about their perceptions of vulnerability (Duffield et al. 2000: 44). 
SCF adopted an innovative solution to the problems created by the Community 
Delivery System. It did not attempt to impose external criteria for distribution but 
relied on the advice of community leaders to establish the criteria for 
vulnerability. Village chiefs had the responsibility to distribute aid, while SCF tried 
to ensure that these criteria were equitable and to carry out follow-up visits with 
the aim to ensure that those identified were indeed receiving relief. As many 
people were without representation and thus extremely vulnerable, SCF withheld 
some relief items from the regular distribution conducted by the chiefs and the 
withheld items were then targeted to those who had been omitted but were still in 
need (Duffield et al. 2000: 184). This illustrates that sufficient knowledge of the 
local political and social norms may contribute to INGOs’ efficiency in targeting 
emergency humanitarian aid. Furthermore, INGO’s flexibility should enable them 
to adapt quickly to the changing contexts. 
 
MSF’s relief programme during the 1998 famine illustrated the importance of 
targeting the correct groups in order to obtain efficiency. MSF did not have the 
capacity to tackle the underlying problem of inadequate food distribution. 
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Therefore, it established selective feeding programmes while advocating 
improvements in the general ration. Admission criteria were made more stringent 
but a high level of care was maintained. For example, the therapeutic feeding 
centres admitted only children who were less than 70% of their weight for height 
instead of the usual 60%. Because of this, recovery rates fell below the indicated 
norm of 75% after two months. According to Griekspoor and Collins (2001), 
prioritising less intensive treatment for those having a better survival chance, 
would have been more cost effective. Large scale feeding centres with reduced 
quality would have freed up capacity to increase the coverage of the programme. 
 
4.3.4.   The Do No Harm Approach 
The implementation of the “do no harm” approach will be evaluated by examining 
how the relief-to-development continuum contributed to GoS strategies, and the 
consequences of INGOs that decided to withdraw from the Southern sector. 
 
According to Duffield (2002), aid was complicit with wider forms of oppression to 
which displaced Southerners living in the North were subject. The aid-based IDP 
identity reverberated with state forms of decentralisation and developmental 
ideas of self-sufficiency articulate with the commercial need for cheap agricultural 
labour. Development strategies tended to reinforce the subordination of 
Southerners rather than enhance their autonomy. Rather than providing a 
solution, INGOs were part of the wider system of dominance in which 
southerners struggled to survive. (Duffield, 2002: 83).  
 
When examining the impact of aid on social and political dynamics in Northern 
Sudan, it is not relief per se that is under discussion but very largely 
developmental relief (Duffield et al. 2000: 103). As previously mentioned, the 
increase in developmental aid resulted in a decrease of emergency aid. The lack 
of sufficient food sources, including food aid, forced Southerners to migrate to 
Khartoum or transition camps (the border areas between Northern and Southern 
Sudan). 
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The migration of Southerners to the North resonated with the GoS military 
strategy. Large-scale displacement of southerners had the military purpose of 
weakening the SPLM/A and its supporters and serving as an incentive for 
Southerners to support factions allied with Khartoum (Duffield et al. 2000: 104). 
 
Internally displaced Southerners provided the necessary cheap labour on which 
North Sudan’s commercial agriculture depended (Duffield, 2002: 84). The 
exploitive relationships between IDPs and Northern Sudanese was repackaged 
by INGOs as food-for-work projects, despite the fact that IDPs in Northern Sudan 
were subject to a wide range of unequal and highly exploitative relationships, 
which ranged from slavery, non-sustainable share-cropping arrangements, 
casual agricultural and urban labour, domestic services and so on. Thus, IDPs 
were subject to dominant networks and power relations linking local merchants, 
commercial farmers, government officials and military officers. Furthermore, 
INGOs were, albeit unknowingly, complicit in strengthening these exploitive 
networks, by encouraging the implementation of development programmes. For 
example, rehabilitation programmes run by SCF, including agricultural 
development programmes in Southern Darfur, micro-credit schemes and seeds 
banks, contributed to the government strategies (Duffield, 2002).  
 
In the Southern sector, INGOs adopted a stronger stance on the “do no harm” 
approach. However, their actions illustrated that INGOs were ineffective in 
determining the cost-benefits of implementing this approach. In other words, how 
do INGOs know that their humanitarian programmes are fuelling the conflict and, 
more importantly, how do they determine that their withdrawal will be more 
beneficial to the affected population than the continuation of their programmes?  
 
CARE in Western Equatoria used the “do no harm” analysis to determine 
whether to repair feeder or trunk roads as part of a grain-marketing project. On 
the basis that trunk roads could be used for military purposes, it chose to limit its 
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assistance to feeder roads. The decision had costs as the project only did the 
bare minimum to keep the market going. Repairing trunk roads could have 
enhanced food security, but the improvements might also have benefited the 
SPLM/A. There is no relevant calculus for assessing the cost-benefits of such 
decisions (Bradbury et al. 2000: 59). 
 
In March 2000, the SPLM/A demanded that all OLS partner INGOs that were 
operating in SPLM/A controlled areas sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU), stipulating the conditions under which they may operate. INGOs 
complained that the MoU violated the customary principles of neutrality and 
independence. Thus, eleven INGOs refused to sign the MoU, including MSF, 
World Vision, CARE, Oxfam and SCF, and had to evacuate their staff from South 
Sudan (Maaroufi, 2000). The INGOs’ claim that the MoU threatened their 
independence and neutrality was valid. However, considering the fact that INGOs 
were mere extensions of the GoS in the North sector (Karim et al., 1996) and that 
their humanitarian programmes contributed to the government’s military and 
economic objectives, their decision to withdraw from the Southern sector seemed 
hypocritical. Furthermore, INGOs have signed operative regulations with the 
GoS’ Humanitarian Aid Commission, which was created by the GoS to control 
distribution of aid to displaced people, and to control employment and 
appointments of senior national staff with INGOs. According to the SPLM/A “[t]he 
MoU was prepared in good faith and in the spirit of transparency and 
accountability so that both the NGOs and the SRRA can approach their duties 
and roles responsibly” (Nhial, 2000). The refusal to sign the MoU led to some 
accusing INGOs of not wanting to be held accountable for their poor performance 
by the SPLM/A (Harragin, n.d). Furthermore, those INGOs which decided to sign 
the MoU stated that due to institutional weaknesses within the SPLM/A, they did 
not have the capacity to exert complete control over INGO programmes. 
 
Taking into account the lack of development and self-sufficiency in Southern 
Sudan, the withdrawal of Oxfam, World Vision, CARE, MSF and SCF and the 
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cessation of their relief programmes had dire consequences on the beneficiaries 
of these programmes. In Yambio, for example, World Vision had run primary care 
and mother-and-child units for 10 years. When World Vision pulled out due to the 
MoU, all the centres closed with local staff unable to keep facilities going. Illness 
and death increased by 50% from March 2000 and of this 40% resulted from 
diseases that could have been treated with simple primary care (Bower, 2000; 
WHO; 2000). The ratification of MoU, which would not have had a significant 
impact on World Vision’s programmes, might have been preferable to a 50% in 
increase morbidity and mortality. After renegotiating the terms of the MoU, the 
INGOs returned to Southern Sudan. This example illustrated that INGOs need to 
calculate carefully the cost-benefits of the “do no harm” approach as the 
withdrawal of INGOs may have disastrous consequences for beneficiaries 
(Bower, 2000; WHO, 2000). 
 
4.3.5. Protection of Human Rights 
The presence of INGOs in Sudan did offer the civilian population a certain 
degree of protection form violent attacks by the belligerents. However, when 
push came to shove, INGO presence was not enough to protect the lives and 
livelihood of civilians. OLS illustrated that INGOs were weak in protecting the 
human rights of war-affected populations, especially when humanitarian 
operations were implemented within the context of an ongoing war. The absence 
of international military peacekeepers in Sudan increased the civilian population’s 
vulnerability to attacks from both the GoS and rebel movements. Sudan’s 
experience suggested that INGOs did not have the capacity to protect civilians 
and questions whether INGOs should be responsible for offering this service 
(Cliffe and White, 2000: 326). 
 
INGOs’ ability to speak out against human rights abuses was extremely limited in 
the Northern sector and, to a lesser extent, in the Southern sector (through flights 
bans imposed by the GoS). This limitation could be attributed to the strong level 
of control the GoS had over granting access to INGOs. For example, both Oxfam 
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and SCF were almost expelled from the North in 2004, after speaking out against 
the GoS. Oxfam had criticised a UN Security Council Resolution issued in 
Nairobi, which contained weaker wording on the possibility of sanctions against 
the GoS than previous resolutions. SCF accused the GoS of dropping a bomb 
near one of its feeding centres (Goodman, 2004). During OLS, gaining access to 
affected populations took precedence over reporting human rights abuses. This 
suggests that humanitarian INGOs should not be involved in the protection of 
human rights; this function should be left to human rights INGOs.  
 
Some INGOs incorporated a human rights approach to their work; however, what 
had changed was not so much what agencies actually did, as how they 
presented it (Duffield et al. 2000: 27). From September 1998, CARE and Oxfam 
adopted a rights-based approach in Sudan. The organisations made a distinction 
between human rights construed in legal terms, which were associated with 
monitoring and enforcement, and human rights understood as a moral force, 
which referred to the moral right resulting from membership to the human race. 
The moral interpretation formed the basis of CARE’s work. Thus, the focus was 
not on monitoring or enforcement but rather on developing CARE’s core social 
and economic work by improving its implementation and accompanying 
educational and awareness campaigns (Duffield et al. 2000: 112). Relief work 
had been reinvented as a matter of survival rights and social and economic 
rights. This had diluted other, more legalistic approaches, without seriously 
challenging the violence and exploitation, which gave rise to economic and social 
vulnerability (Duffield et al. 2000: 27).  
 
4.4. Problems and Weaknesses with INGOs 
Certain common problems inherent in INGO structures and programming had a 
negative effect on their ability to implement humanitarian programmes, which 
reflected the needs of beneficiaries effectively. These weaknesses were a lack of 
accountability to beneficiaries; institutional amnesia and a lack of local 
knowledge; a lack of monitoring and evaluation; and a lack of transparency. 
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A common problem, which arises within humanitarian operations, is the multitude 
of actors to whom INGOs are accountable: donors, beneficiaries and their board 
of trustees. The financial influence of donors makes INGOs susceptible to the 
interests of powerful donor governments. This phenomenon was clearly 
illustrated by the tendency of INGOs to adopt the relief-to-development 
continuum, which was propagated by donors in Sudan, even though the local 
milieu was not conducive to this approach. For example, one relief worker stated 
that “[w]e perceive that donors, particularly the European commission and 
Euronaid, would prefer that we do rehabilitation rather than relief…The Euronaid 
funding guidelines stress rehabilitation and development and will therefore not 
give relief food” (Bradbury et al. 1997: 228). Thus, INGO humanitarian 
programmes did not reflect the needs of the war-affected civilian populations, but 
rather the interests of donors. Beneficiaries of relief could not choose or even 
protest against potential failures within the humanitarian system. The 
accountability and interrelationship between the INGOs in the OLS and the 
international community took precedence as an integral part of the operational 
structure of OLS (Rhodes, 2002: 19). 
 
INGOs attempted to pass accountability for the failure of some of their 
programmes to the belligerents, accusing them of large-scale diversion of relief 
goods. Diversion by both the GoS and SPLM/A did take place in Sudan; 
conversely, compared to other humanitarian emergencies, diversion of 
humanitarian relief did not happen on such a large scale to warrant INGOs’ 
claims. Thus, diversion could not be used as an excuse for the ineffectiveness of 
INGOs’ humanitarian programmes (Duffield et al. 2000: 187). 
 
The hostile environment that INGOs had to work in ensured a high staff turn over 
leading to a common relief organisation disease known as institutional amnesia, 
where the same mistakes were cyclically repeated, the same imported 
assumptions were used and the relief aid was consistently misappropriated. 
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Without a certain level of donor and INGO accountability towards its recipients, 
the high turnover rates of relief staff ensured that the same mistakes were made 
and the structural problems within the humanitarian programmes were never 
addressed (Rhodes, 2002: 11). 
 
Most INGO representatives had a historical perspective of one, or at most, two 
years. INGO expatriate staff in Khartoum who had more that twelve moths 
experience were considered seasoned experts (Duffield et al. 2000: 79). Oxfam 
had seven different representatives in Khartoum in ten years. Thus, despite 
INGOs having years of experience in Sudan, few INGO Country Directors 
appeared to know what their agencies were doing a few moths ago (Duffiled et 
al. 2000: 20). SCF and CARE ran similar types of projects in the same areas of 
Northern Sudan since the mid-1980s. Attempting to encourage self-sufficiency 
was a recurrent theme over this whole period; however, it appeared to have had 
little success. For example, in 2000, both SCF and CARE attempted to establish 
food security early warning systems in the Northern Province in Darfur and 
Kordofan, respectively. Both were seemingly unaware of the similar efforts that 
were made by their agencies during the mid-1980 (Duffield et al. 2000: 80). 
David Keens observation, made in the 1980s, that INGOs seemed “trapped in a 
perpetual present” (Duffield et al. 2000: 82) appeared to be true throughout the 
history of OLS.  
 
The difficulties faced by INGOs in targeting the vulnerable and implementing the 
relief-to-development continuum could have been circumnavigated if INGOs had 
had a greater understanding of the local context in which they were operating. 
During the 1998 famine, INGOs were determined to use their own definition of 
famine, and their own definition of beneficiary (Harragin, n. d.). Despite high 
mortality rates among the residents and IDPs, the situation was often described 
as experiencing extreme stress or as a crisis but not yet as a famine. SCF, 
Oxfam and MSF did not claim that Bahr el-Ghazal was experiencing a famine 
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until April, despite the fact that February and March were the critical months of 
duress (Rhodes, 2002: 24). 
 
As early as 1986, Oxfam was involved with projects that provided donkey-carts 
and goats for the displaced in Khartoum. These were standard development 
projects, and inputs were provided as loans and intended to boost income and 
child nutrition. INGOs working with IDPs were well aware that they were subject 
to intimidation. In the event, the projects proved naïve and dangerous for the 
displaced. The donkey-carts and goats were looted by predatory neighbours, and 
the police detained several beneficiaries of the goat distribution, accusing them 
of theft. Oxfam had to intervene at the police station and be satisfied with freeing 
the accused minus their goats. Since the early 1990s, INGOs continued to 
implement such projects often with similar results. Oxfam was working in a 
development fashion in three displaced camps in Ed’Dien. The provision of 
donkey-carts and goats on credit was a feature of such projects. In all these 
camps, some of the carts ended up in the possession of the host community 
(Duffield et al. 2000). Not only is this experience an example of institutional 
amnesia, but it also sheds light on the possible negative consequences that 
development programmes may have within the context of a CPE. The same 
ineffective programme was continually implemented, resulting in the same 
negative outcome. Furthermore, this programme made beneficiaries more 
vulnerable to looting and asset transfer, which reinforced inter-group divisions 
and tensions within the community. 
  
INGOs’ ineffective monitoring and evaluation methods exacerbated their lack of 
local knowledge. For example, few INGOs had mechanisms in place, which 
monitored the effects of distributing emergency aid and the impact of 
implementing the relief-to-development approach. The inability of OLS to 
coordinate INGO activities resulted in all INGOs creating their own needs 
assessment. In South Sudan alone, there were five monitoring systems. Hence, 
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there was no single accurate needs-based assessment to coordinate future 
operations (Rhodes, 2002: 14-16). 
  
Fears of funding termination and expulsion reduced INGO humanitarianism in 
Sudan to a clandestine activity lacking the original, benign intentions of 
conducting a neutral, transparent operation. This lack of transparency was 
evident in the actions of World Vision, where their reports have actually lowered 
the acceptable standards of nutrition in an effort to accommodate their levels of 
success. By lowering the standard of severe malnutrition from being 60% or 
below the weight beneficiaries should be, compared to their height, to 80 % or 
below, World Vision made their programme appear more successful than it really 
was to donors. According to their report, World Vision managed to reduce the 
number of malnourished children in Gogrial from 40.8% to 11.9%. Furthermore, 
their report failed to mention that fighting in the area had ceased, allowing market 
activity and natural migration to be reinstated. A return to relatively peaceful 
market activity was probably the key reason for the civilians’ nutritional 
improvement. By exaggerating the results of their relief programmes, INGOs 
receive more media attention, improve their standing with donors and receive 
more funding (Rhodes, 2002: 25).   
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The experiences in the Sudan suggest that INGOs were more adept at offering 
emergency relief to people in need than fostering development within the context 
of a CPE. The conditions that needed to be present for development to take root 
were absent from Sudan. The local environment was insecure with an acute lack 
of respect for human rights. Humanitarian access was hindered by flight bans by 
the GoS and threats of INGO expulsion from Sudan. The emergency in Sudan 
was not over by the time INGOs attempted to implement development 
programmes. Donor governments did not fully accept the legitimacy of neither 
the GoS nor the SPLM/A. The civil war in the Sudan resulted in the destruction of 
the local infrastructure, the economic market, the agricultural sector and the 
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health sector. Linking relief to development is impossible to achieve in a situation 
where there is nothing for developmental relief to link. Thus, Sudan was not 
conductive to development. 
 
Despite INGOs achieving a certain degree of success in delivering emergency 
relief, the adoption of the relief-to-development continuum circumnavigated 
potential successes in this area. The adoption of the relief-to-development 
continuum resulted in a decrease in the availability of emergency relief, which 
had a detrimental effect in the Sudan. The reduction of emergency assistance did 
not reflect the needs of the war-affected population: the civil war and famines had 
greatly diminished civilians’ access to life sustaining resources. The inability of 
developmental programmes to bear fruit exacerbated this problem, as 
unsuccessful development programmes could not compensate for the reduction 
in emergency aid. 
 
INGOs experienced problems in targeting the vulnerable. Nonetheless, the 
examples of Oxfam and SCF illustrated that effective monitoring and evaluation 
tactics enabled INGOs to identify the inaccuracies within their targeting methods. 
SCF acted upon this knowledge and greatly improved in targeting the vulnerable. 
 
The examples of INGOs implementing the “do no harm” approach indicates that 
INGOs need to be all knowing in order to determine the cost-benefits of their 
possible withdrawal. However, taking into account the institutional amnesia and 
lack of local knowledge INGOs suffer from, it seems unlikely that INGOs will be 
able to calculate effectively the impact of their operations or lack thereof. The 
withdrawal of INGOs in 2000 had a negative impact on the well-being of their 
beneficiaries. Self-sufficiency had not been achieved in Sudan, which added fuel 
to the fire when the INGOs decide to withdraw. 
 
The level of influence the GoS exerted over the humanitarian programmes in 
Sudan, and their ability to expel INGOs, resulted in gaining and maintaining 
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access to affected populations taking precedence over the protection of human 
rights.  
 
Problems, which are common to INGOs offering humanitarian assistance, were 
evident in Sudan. A lack of accountability; institutional amnesia and a lack of 
local knowledge; and transparency had a negative effect on the efficiency of 
INGO’s humanitarian programmes. 
 
INGOs play an important role in offering emergency relief to war affected 
civilians. Their actions are instrumental in saving the lives of civilians affected by 
CPEs. However, certain operational decisions (the relief-to-development 
continuum, targeting, the “do no harm” approach, and the protection of human 
rights), as well as various factors inherent to INGOs (lack of accountability, 
institutional amnesia and lack of local knowledge; ineffective monitoring and 
evaluation methods; and transparency) hinder their effectiveness in delivering 
relief.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONLUSION 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates INGOs’ peace-building capacities in Sudan, by 
evaluating the effectiveness of the implementation of the relief-to-development 
continuum. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the current 
situation in Sudan are investigated to determine whether INGO activities have 
succeeded in creating self-sufficiency, development and a positive peace. Have 
INGOs been effective in offering humanitarian relief within the context of a CPE? 
Have they succeeded in implementing the relief-to-development continuum, and 
what effects has this policy had on their overall humanitarian relief programmes? 
The theoretical link between development and peace-building are discussed and 
placed within the local context of Sudan, to determine whether the local context 
was conducive to the relief-to-development continuum. INGOs weaknesses 
concerning the implementation of this continuum are discussed, as well as 
external factors that influenced their performance in this field. 
  
5.2. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Current Situation in 
Sudan 
OLS’ mandate ended with the signing of the CPA between the GoS and the 
SPLM/A on January 9, 2005. The CPA mandated the sharing of national wealth 
and power between the ruling National Congress Party and the SPLM/A. These 
provisions included naming the SPLM/A leader to the office of the Vice President 
of the Republic, as well as giving the SPLM/A limited veto and consultative 
authority. However, the implementation of the CPA has been fraught with 
challenges. In spite of the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU), 
many of the reforms mandated by the CPA have yet to be implemented (Burns 
and Maxwell, 2008: 7). 
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The CPA created a negative peace in Sudan by halting the violence between the 
GoS and the SPLM/A. However, a positive peace has not been implemented as 
the root causes of the conflict have not been addressed, and if they have, the 
necessary reforms have not been executed. This statement is evident from the 
conflict in Darfur and the humanitarian emergency it has created. 
 
The conflict in Darfur escalated into a civil war in February 2003, when the rebel 
movements, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), jointly attacked government garrisons. Similar to the civil wars 
between the GoS and the SPLM/A, the civil war in Darfur is a response to the 
frustrations about decades of political oppression and economic neglect by the 
Khartoum government (Mans, 2004: 292). The scorched earth tactics employed 
by the GoS and the SPLM/A during Sudan’s civil wars, were being utilised in the 
Darfur conflict. These tactics have resulted in a CPE where the affected 
population is in need of humanitarian assistance. Surprisingly, while this conflict 
was taking place, the GoS and the SPLM/A were negotiating the CPA. The 
Darfur conflict continued long after the CPA was signed in January 2005. 
 
Thus, despite the implementation of OLS, and the signing of the CPA, INGOs 
programmes failed in its peace-building initiatives. The humanitarian 
programmes implemented by INGOs, under the OLS mandate, did not create a 
self-sufficient population, as the civilian population is still dependent on foreign 
humanitarian relief. Currently, the infrastructure in Sudan is still underdeveloped, 
and large food deficits remain in some geographical areas, particularly the most 
vulnerable to drought and flooding, and those with the highest influx of returnees. 
The levels of vulnerability are likely to increase as the return of refugees and 
internally displaced people continues (Burns and Maxwell, 2008: 10). The 
explosion of violence in Darfur suggests that the root causes of conflict in Sudan 
have not been properly addressed. Thus, the claim that humanitarianism can 
ameliorate the root causes of conflict is not evident in Sudan. 
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5.3. Peace-building and Development 
INGOs have become major players in the international humanitarian regime due 
to the tendency of donor governments to subcontract relief to INGOs, and the 
extensive financial resources these agencies receive from donors. Some 
commentators have suggested that INGOs are more effective in implementing 
peace-building initiatives, because they interact with local grass-roots 
organisations in an attempt to foster development and self-sufficiency through 
the implementation of the relief-to-development continuum (Macrae, 2000; 
Harvey, 1998; Rigby, 2001). Within the relief-to-development continuum, 
sustainable development is seen as a possible contribution to the peace-building 
process (Pugh, 1998: 7). The long-lasting nature of contemporary CPEs has led 
to aspiration on the part of the international humanitarian regime to move beyond 
relief and engage in rehabilitation and development even during ongoing conflicts 
(Harvey, 1998: 200; Rigby, 2001: 957).  
 
This continuum rests on the premise that humanitarianism should have a 
developmental characteristic, which should theoretically contribute to the peace-
building process. Peace-building endeavours to tackle the root causes of 
violence by ameliorating the structural violence present in CPEs. Peace-building 
is placed within the relief-to-development continuum; therefore, peace-building 
activities refer to rehabilitation, development and self-sufficiency (Scholms, 2003; 
Woodhouse, 2000). However, some argue that the relief-to-development 
continuum cannot be implemented within the context of a CPE. It unfeasible for 
relief to link to anything that may foster development because the local 
infrastructure, the economic markets, the health and agricultural sectors have all 
been devastated. According to this view, INGOs should limit their programmes to 
the delivery of emergency humanitarian relief.  
 
In order to determine whether INGOs contributed positively to the peace-building 
process in Sudan, their implementation of the relief-to-development continuum 
needs to be evaluated. 
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5.4. INGOs’ Peace-Building Capacities: Why the Implementation of the 
Relief-to-Development Continuum Failed  
The failure of the relief-to-development continuum can be attributed to the fact 
that the local context was not conducive to development programmes. Firstly, 
from 1994 to 2004, large areas in Sudan were very insecure and suffered from 
sporadic attacks. What exacerbated this was the fact that in certain areas, which 
were reasonably secure, fighting, could flare up unexpectedly. Furthermore, 
there was an acute lack of respect for human rights. Despite development 
programmes taking root and creating livelihoods, the lack of respect for the 
human rights of civilians made them targets to belligerents that wished to raid 
them (Bradbury et al. 1997).  
 
Secondly, it is very difficult if not impossible to implement development initiatives 
within the context of a CPE. When the relief-to-development continuum was 
implemented in 1994, Sudan was still suffering from a chronic political 
emergency. Within this context, it was impossible for relief to link to anything that 
could foster development because the local infrastructure, the economic markets, 
the health sector and the agricultural sector had all been destroyed. Furthermore, 
the development of civilian livelihoods in an insecure environment made them 
targets of raiding and looting. Insecurity encouraged migration, which made the 
implementation of development activities unlikely as civilians did not stay in one 
area long enough to obtain self-sufficiency. During times of famine or hardship, 
the war-affected population was either too hungry or too exhausted to participate 
in INGO development programmes (Bradbury et al. 1997). 
 
Finally, donors must accept the legitimacy of both the government and the rebels 
involved in the conflict. This characteristic was also lacking from Sudan. For 
example, the US was critical towards the GoS and openly funded programmes 
that benefited the SPLM/A areas. One the other hand, despite the SPLM/A 
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having de facto sovereignty in the Southern sector, the international community 
did not wish to confer legitimacy on the rebel movement (Fox, 2001). 
 
Certain weaknesses inherent to INGOs made their development programmes 
ineffective. Due to a lack of continuous resources, INGO were forced to target 
the most vulnerable for distribution in an attempt to minimise exclusion. The 
Sudan experience illustrated that INGOs displayed an astonishing lack of 
knowledge concerning local realities and that few agencies attempted to monitor 
or evaluate the impact of their targeting. Furthermore, external INGO and internal 
community definitions of vulnerability and who deserves assistance was not the 
same. This resulted in either the wrong groups being targeted or large-scale 
diversion of relief. Target groups in Sudan were defined as the physiologically 
vulnerable, the socially vulnerable and the economically vulnerable. Yet, in 
Sudan, local representatives favoured their own people in distribution and 
resident populations were often given priority over the displaced. Thus, the most 
vulnerable were those populations that lacked local representation (Jaspars and 
Shoham, 1999: 362-365). The examples of Oxfam and SCF illustrated that 
effective monitoring and evaluation methods greatly improved targeting practices. 
These INGOs addressed this issue by monitoring and evaluating the impact of 
their programmes, and made the necessary alterations to their programmes to be 
more applicable to the local context. The ability of these INGOs to respond 
quickly to the information they gathered indicated that INGO flexibility, used in 
conjunction with monitoring and evaluation, could greatly increase the efficiency 
of a programme. 
 
INGOs seem more adapt in monitoring and evaluating the effects of delivering 
emergency humanitarian relief than the effects of their developmental 
programmes. For example, the relief-to-development continuum contributed to 
GoS strategies. The reduction in emergency relief encouraged southern 
Sudanese to migrate north to IDP camps, where they were able to receive food 
aid. Firstly, this weakened the SPLM/A’s and its supporters and served as an 
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incentive for southerners to support factions allied with Khartoum. Secondly, the 
IDPs provided the necessary cheap labour on which North Sudan’s commercial 
agriculture depended (Duffield et al. 2000). INGOs never addressed these issues 
or altered their programmes to prevent the migration of southern Sudanese to the 
North.  
 
The presence of INGOs did offer civilians a certain degree of protection from 
violent attacks. Although, the insecure environment, and the ability of the GoS to 
deny access to conflict-affected areas, made it difficult for INGOs to safeguard 
the human rights of civilians. Gaining access always took precedent over 
speaking out about human rights abuses. The Sudan experience suggests that 
humanitarian INGOs should not be too involved in protecting human rights. Their 
main objective should be the delivery of humanitarian assistance, while human 
rights NGOs should be preoccupied with protecting the human rights of civilians 
(Cliffe and White, 2000). 
 
INGOs’ decision to adopt the relief-to-development continuum was not based on 
realities in Sudan, but on the interest of donor governments. Some INGOs stated 
that emergency relief was more necessary than development relief; however, 
donors were not willing to give resources to emergency relief programmes as 
their preferred to fund developmental programmes. INGOs have a tendency to 
be more accountable to their donors than beneficiaries, because they are 
financially dependent on donors. This calls into question the principle of 
independence. 
 
One of the greatest weaknesses of INGOs in implementing the relief-to-
development continuum was their institutional amnesia and their lack of local 
knowledge. Firstly, institutional amnesia and a lack of operational learning 
indicated that INGOs made the same mistakes repeatedly, the same imported 
assumptions were used and the development programmes were repeatedly 
misappropriated. Secondly, due to their lack of local knowledge, INGOs’ 
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development initiatives were not conducive to the local environment. For 
example, the food security early warning systems implemented by SCF and 
CARE in Darfur and Kordofan; Oxfam’s projects that provided donkey-carts and 
goats; and the various programmes geared towards agricultural development. 
(Rhodes, 2002). Institutional amnesia, combined with a lack of monitoring and 
evaluation, calls into question the ability of INGOs to implement the “do no harm” 
approach. This approach is based on the ability of INGOs to identify and avoid 
humanitarian programmes that may have a negative effect on the local peace-
building process. The actions of INGOs in Sudan suggest that INGOs were not 
equipped to determine which programmes reinforced inter-group divisions and 
tensions, and undermined and weakened inter-group connections. 
 
INGOs’ lack of transparency when reporting on their activities made it difficult to 
determine whether their projects were successful or unsuccessful. INGOs 
discouraged beneficiary feedback as any negative comments could have 
weakened their standing with donors and resulted in a cut in funding. The 
positive results they reported on were often exaggerated, as the example of 
World Vision illustrated (Rhodes, 2002). These exaggerated results could have 
had disastrous consequences, because it could result in decreased funding, as 
the situation appears to be less dire that what it actually is. Honest, transparent 
reports may offer a wealth of information, which may be used to ensure that the 
same mistakes are not repeated in the future. 
   
Sudan was suffering form a chronic CPE in 1994 and in such a context, the 
uncritical pursuit of developmental strategies had had a negative effect on the 
welfare of the conflict-affected populations. The main method of linking relief to 
development in Sudan was the reduction in emergency relief justified on the 
belief that relief fosters dependency. However, there was no evidence from 
Sudan to suggest that the delivery of emergency relief created dependency. 
Taking into account OLS’ history of a lack of continuous financial inputs by 
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donors, the operation as a whole did not deliver enough aid to Sudan to produce 
dependency (Jaspars and Shoham, 1999).  
 
Given the absence of any evidence of dependency in Sudan and the lack of any 
comprehensive development tool that relief activities could link to, it was 
imprudent to cut relief in the hope of promoting self-sufficiency. The cut in 
emergency relief did not reflect the realities in Sudan. Thus, even though the 
number of people in need of emergency aid did not decrease, the general ration 
for war-affected populations did. Furthermore, the development programmes 
initiated by INGOs did not compensate for the reduction in emergency relief 
(Duffield et al. 2000). 
 
INGOs failed to contribute to the peace-building process in Sudan as their 
developmental relief programmes largely failed to foster development, 
rehabilitation, and self-sufficiency. The decrease in relief aid had a detrimental 
effect on the well-being of beneficiaries as development programmes could not 
compensate for the cut in emergency relief aid. This resulted in missed 
opportunities, which could have contributed to the peace-building process. 
Emergency relief could have enabled households to conserve their assets and 
remain in their home area, thereby supporting agricultural and livestock 
programmes; it could have reduced conflict in that a infusion of resources into a 
reasonably secure, yet resource poor area may have decreased the likelihood of 
criminal misappropriation of food and other supplies; and it could have reduced 
dependency in the sense that it could have enabled households to store their 
assets and prevent migration (Duffield et al. 2000). An adequate amount of food 
aid may have had a greater impact on the peace-building process than 
developmental initiatives. 
 
5.5. INGOs and Emergency Relief 
Compared to the development initiatives implemented by INGOs, they were more 
effective in delivering emergency aid to the civilian population. Although food aid 
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inputs were small, they assisted in keeping household labour force intact, 
reduced the amount of time spent on obtaining alternative food sources and 
helped rebuild networks of kinship and exchange between nearby communities. 
Despite the fact that INGOs had trouble in targeting the vulnerable, the 
innovative responses by Oxfam and SCF to this problem illustrated that INGOs 
can effectively target the vulnerable if they employ the correct monitoring and 
evaluation methods (Duffield et al. 2000). 
 
INGOs were instrumental in offering the war-affected population with access to 
basic and emergency health care. For example, in Akuen the MSF supported 
hospital was the only available health facility in the region. The action of INGOs 
in the health sector helped prevent the spread of infectious diseases and 
decreased the mortality rate in Sudan (MSF, 2003). MSF played a crucial role in 
keeping the health sector running. Despite the fact that Sudan did not achieve 
self-sufficiency in the health sector, INGOs played an active role in keeping the 
health sector running, and in offering civilians access to basic health care.  
 
5.6. External Factor that Influenced INGO Performance 
While INGOs need to be held accountable for their humanitarian programmes, 
certain factors outside of their control had a negative impact on their operations. 
Under the auspices of OLS, the UN conceded to the GoS the rights to determine 
which geographical areas were “war zones” and which were “affected by war”. 
INGO only had access to areas “affected by war”. Thus, the GoS could control 
which areas in the Southern sector would receive humanitarian assistance 
(Karim et al. 1996). In the North, INGOs were mere extensions of the GoS’ 
policies and aspirations. The GoS exerted tremendous control over the 
operational function of OLS as a whole. Within this context, INGOs had little 
room to manoeuvre and effectively implement their programmes. 
 
One of the greatest restrains OLS faced was a lack of a reliable source of 
funding. This was exacerbated by the decision of donors to adopt a relief-to-
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development approach. Financial support for emergency food aid began to shrink 
as donor financing shifted to developmental aid. Within the international 
humanitarian regime, donors exerted a significant level of control over INGOs 
because they controlled the purse strings. When donors embraced the relief-to-
development continuum, INGOs were forced to follow suit, despite some claiming 
that emergency relief was more important at the time. This diminished INGOs’ 
capacities to delivery emergency food aid, which was one of their more 
successful programmes in Sudan. Furthermore, inconsistent donor funding often 
caused contradictory strategies between INGOs and the UN. While donors 
provide resources for INGOs whose activities were generally constant with OLS’ 
development objectives, there was no specified accountability to the UN, even 
though the same donors expected the UN to exercise overall coordination 
(Rhodes, 2002).  
 
Despite claims that OLS would coordinate and monitor the action of humanitarian 
agencies under its control, a loose amalgamation of INGOs with different criteria 
and interests that, based on a competitive funding system, remained ad hoc 
without any unified leadership or even a consolidated information system. During 
the 1990s, INGOs in Southern Sudan were not an integral part of the 
assessment process for future plans of OLS action. Failing to include INGOs in 
the OLS programming not only resulted in a loss of potential expertise, but also 
led to ineffective coordination, a vital component to any relief programme and a 
crucial component in any large-scale relief programme. 
 
This research indicates that giving INGOs the responsibility to foster 
development and create self-sufficiency is misplaced. Political diplomacy has 
been replaced by humanitarian relief, conferring the responsibility to end conflicts 
and build a positive peace from nation-states to INGOs and other humanitarian 
agencies. However, humanitarianism cannot effectively fill the vacuum left by the 
withdrawal of diplomacy. In other words, humanitarianism is not enough to put an 
end to a war and create a positive peace. The peace-building process in Sudan 
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would have benefited more had the international community placed diplomatic 
pressure on the belligerents to cease hostilities. This does not suggest that 
humanitarian agencies should withdraw assistance to those in need. What is 
needed is a combination of relief; the incorporation of external relief into internal 
coping mechanisms; and the use of intensive diplomacy and political pressure by 
the international community to end the violence (Rhodes, 2002).  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
Humanitarian INGOs failed to build a positive peace in Sudan through their 
development programmes. The premise that humanitarian aid can foster 
development, which will contribute to the peace-building process, is not 
applicable to Sudan. The upsurge of conflict in Darfur indicates than the root 
causes of conflict in Sudan were not addressed effectively. Furthermore, INGO 
programmes were unable to create self-sufficiency, as many areas in Sudan are 
still dependent on receiving humanitarian assistance. 
 
The failure of these programmes can be attributed to the local context of the 
Sudan: there was widespread insecurity and a little respect for human rights; the 
emergency was not over by the time development initiatives were implemented; 
and the international community did not recognise all parties to the conflict. 
INGOs should have been able to identify these characteristics and could have 
done more to persuade the donor community that emergency relief was more 
important than developmental relief. Donors should also take responsibility for 
the implementation of the relief-to-development continuum and the 
consequences these programmes had on the peace-building process in Sudan. 
INGO developmental programmes may have had a positive effect in an area that 
had moved beyond an emergency and was experiencing a certain level of 
security. 
 
Critiques against INGOs’ humanitarian programmes that have been frequently 
raised in various humanitarian relief operations negatively affected their 
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programme implementation in Sudan. These include ineffective targeting 
methods; accountability; a lack of transparency; institutional amnesia; and 
ineffective monitoring and evolution method. However, some INGOs found 
innovative ideas to circumnavigate these problems. Thus, INGOs had the 
potential to do good, although they needed to be more careful in implementing 
their programmes. Furthermore, their development programmes would have 
been more effective in areas that were reasonably secure. 
 
Some external factors curtailed INGO programmes. These included the level of 
control the GoS had over OLS’ operations; the influence of donor interests and 
unreliable funding; the inability of OLS to coordinate effectively the activities of 
members; and the lack of international diplomacy. 
 
The failure of INGOs in building peace in Sudan has been noteworthy. The 
Sudan experience questions the premise that humanitarian INGOs should foster 
development and, in so doing, contribute to the peace-building process. The 
evolution of the relief-to-development continuum, and the inclusion of the peace-
building within this continuum, has conferred the responsibility to end violence 
and establish positive peace from the international community of nation-states to 
INGOs. The implementation of INGO programmes in Sudan indicates that these 
organisations have neither the capacity to stop violence nor the capacity to build 
peace within the context of an ongoing CPE. INGOs should focus on their 
traditional humanitarian mandate of offering emergency relief to war-affected 
populations in need, while giving special attention to monitoring and evaluating 
the impact of their programmes. The international community of nation-states 
should be responsible for applying political pressure, through intensive 
diplomacy, on the belligerents in an attempt to cease violence. 
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